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Throughout its three chapters, this dissertation examines a phenomenon that, although 
underappreciated and underinvestigated in the existing literature, should be of great interest to 
entrepreneurship scholars: angel investing in the United States. While most of the existing studies 
of venture financing have predominantly focused on venture capital (VC) funding, angel 
investing—that is, wealthy individuals investing their own money in new ventures—represents 
almost as large of a market as venture capital, and recent empirical evidence suggests that ventures 
financed by angel investors tend to be more successful than comparable ventures that are not angel-
financed. More interestingly, perhaps, angel investing tends to focus on ventures at the earliest 
stage, which leads to investor making decisions based on very little hard evidence. This results in 
the attempt, on the investors’ part, to reduce uncertainty by leveraging one’s connections and 
community-level patterns of social relations. In this regard, this dissertation’s main objective is to 
tackle the existing literature’s “undersocialized” take on venture financing, and to show the 
sociological mechanisms that might underpin the decision by entrepreneurs to enter the angel 
investing market by becoming suppliers of capital, as well as their capital allocation choices, i.e. 
their investment decisions. Additionally, this work also examines the drivers of success for angel 
investors, with a view to explaining—at least in part—why certain individuals are wildly more 
successful than others at angel investing. Empirically, my work relies on a combination of archival 
data—primarily data gathered from online data source CrunchBase, but also U.S. Census data and 
   
  
hand-collected information from LinkedIn—and fieldwork in the form of interviews with 
entrepreneurs and angel investors, as well as participant observation at the Angel Capital 
Association Annual Meeting in San Francisco, the largest yearly gathering of angel investors. The 
resulting empirical patterns, both qualitative and quantitative, when taken in their entirety suggests 
that angel investing is a social process, and particularly that entrepreneurs are socialized into 
becoming angel investors by interacting with the angels who finance their ventures. Further, this 
work offers evidence that community-level patterns of socialization—i.e. what is generally known 
in sociology as community social capital—also plays a role in determining whether entrepreneurs 
will become angel investors and, once they choose to take this step, whether they will show a 
preference for financing local ventures vis-à-vis pursuing investment opportunities elsewhere. 
Finally, this work also addresses the question of angel investing outcomes—that is, why some 
angel investors are more successful than others, as measured by the number of exits in their 
investment portfolio. In this regard, empirical results suggest that generalists do better than 
specialists, and that angel investors with broad entrepreneurial experience are found to do 
especially well. Success is also a function of effective knowledge translation: on average, 
successful entrepreneurs tend to become more successful angels, and especially so the greater the 
overlap between the entrepreneurial experience of the founder and their angel investment portfolio.  
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PREFACE  
This dissertation comprises three chapters, which are tied together by their common focus on angel 
investing, as well as by a common data collection process. Taken together, the three chapters 
explore: a) entry into angel investing by entrepreneurs, which I often refer to as the transition 
between entrepreneurship and angel investing; b) investment decisions by entrepreneurs-turned-
angels; c) angel investing outcomes and their antecedents. Empirically, the dissertation’s 
cornerstone is CrunchBase, a crowdsourced online database which reports information on 
entrepreneurs, investors, funds, and new ventures, as well as on incubators and accelerators. This 
information is then supplemented with hand-collected LinkedIn information on each of the 
individuals—angels and entrepreneurs—in the sample, which allowed me to collect fine-grained 
information on location, career history and education. To refine my knowledge of the empirical 
setting and to gain relevant domain knowledge, I also collected qualitative data in the form of 
interviews with angel investors and entrepreneurs, as well as participant observation at angel group 
meetings and the Angel Capital Association annual meeting in San Francisco. 
In Chapter I, I examine the question of entry into angel investing by entrepreneurs. While 
a majority of US-based angel investors are former entrepreneurs, what drives this career transition 
is not clear, especially given angel investing’s average returns, which tend to be lower than venture 
capital in spite of angel investing being much riskier. Moreover, as far as theory is concerned, the 
social processes that govern entry into venture financing markets have received little scholarly 
attention, despite their importance for entrepreneurship. I make two sociologically-driven 
arguments: first, that entrepreneurs should be more likely to become angel investors when they 
have received angel funding themselves in the past, due to generalized reciprocity. Further, I argue 
that this effect should be stronger under conditions of homophily—i.e. when entrepreneurs and the 
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angels financing them are similar across one or more dimensions. Finally, the homophily patterns 
in venture financing I just described should be reproduced as entrepreneurs become angel investors 
and make their own funding decisions. My empirical results provide support for these arguments. 
Chapter II, which is joint work with Dan J. Wang, examines the antecedents of successful 
angel investing outcomes by entrepreneurs. Prevailing wisdom in the ecosystem holds that 
entrepreneurs are uniquely positioned to do well as investors, in that they possess tacit knowledge 
not just about their industry, but about the working mechanisms of venture financing, as well. 
Leveraging a sample of U.S. angel investors with entrepreneurial experience drawn from 
CrunchBase and linking their investment performance to their track record as entrepreneurs, show 
that while investing across market categories is associated with a higher number of successful exits 
in general, angel investors with broad entrepreneurial experience are found to do especially well. 
Success is also a function of effective knowledge translation: on average, successful entrepreneurs 
tend to become more successful angels, but we find this effect to be stronger the greater the overlap 
between the entrepreneurial experience of the founder and their angel investment portfolio.  
The third and final chapter, Chapter III, looks into the role played by social capital in the 
emergence of entrepreneurial ecosystem, once again with particular reference to angel investing.  
A useful starting point, here, is the growing scholarly recognition of the fact that entrepreneurial 
ecosystem dynamics are a function, at least in part, of the characteristics the social milieu in which 
they are embedded. Venture financing, in particular, can be seen a social process, insofar as it 
requires the development of relationships between one of more investors and the founding team. 
If this is the case, then community-level characteristics that catalyze and encourage social 
interaction could have a positive effect on the ecosystem. I therefore advance the argument that 
social capital could have a bearing on individual decision concerning entry into venture financing, 
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as well as capital allocation choices. This is because both the decision to become an entrepreneur 
and the eventual, subsequent transition to angel investing are inherently social, and are therefore 
especially likely to occur in communities that are characterized by greater social connectedness. 
Furthermore, areas with more well-developed opportunity structures for socialization should also 
be especially conducive to the development of local financing relationships. In this study, I thus 
examine the role of community social capital in angel investing across Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (MSAs) in the United States between 2005 and 2015. In so doing, I show that: 1) MSAs 
with greater social capital exhibit a higher density of VC-funded entrepreneurs; 2) in such MSAs, 
a greater proportion of this population of entrepreneurs will become angel investors; and 3) such 
areas are also characterized by a comparatively higher proportion of angel investments targeting 
companies within the same MSA. I then discuss the implications of my findings for the literature 
on community social capital in sociology, as well as for the broader scholarly understanding of 
entrepreneurial ecosystems.   
Collectively, the three chapters the dissertation comprises represent my attempt to provide 
a comprehensive account of the phenomenon of angel investing in the United States. While this 
topic has received some attention in the literature (e.g. Shane, 2008; Van Osnabrugge & Robinson, 
2000), I believe that beyond its importance for entrepreneurship, the informal supply of capital 
phenomenon that angel investors exemplify should broadly be of interest to organizational scholars 
and economic sociologists alike, in that it configures an interesting empirical puzzle in a number 
of major ways. First, as I discuss at length in Chapter I, angel investing is time consuming while 
not being especially profitable. As far as capital allocation decisions go, it is therefore quite 
surprising to see it bloom into a market worth more than $20 billion in the U.S. alone, given the 
widespread availability of less time consuming alternatives with equal (or better) profitability. 
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Second, angel investing is uniquely challenging for investors because of the objective lack of 
information they face in most circumstances. Because angel investors typically invest at the 
earliest stage and, in most cases, pre-revenue, not much is known about the objective value of the 
entrepreneurial idea or about the founding team’s ability to implement it and execute it. As a result, 
angel investors routinely engage in a variety of uncertainty reduction strategies, such as seeking 
referrals from trusted connections and relying on specific heuristics (Huang & Pearce, 2015). The 
informal supply of capital can thus be configured as being governed predominantly by social 
dynamics, which should make it an interesting empirical setting for scholars across disciplines.  
Third, the very emergence of a market for the informal supply of capital should in itself be 
surprising, since informal lending patterns have historically been associated with the lack—or the 
ineffectiveness—of formal institutions dedicated to this purposes, such as in the case of 
microfinance (e.g. Canales & Greenberg, 2016). It is then especially noteworthy, then, to see how 
the communities with higher social capital actually show more angel investing, and not less, as 
shown in Chapter III.   
Overall, my research begins to address all of these puzzles by leveraging a variety of 
literatures ranging from organizational perspectives on learning (Levitt & March, 1988; March, 
Sproull, & Tamuz, 1991), specialization (Åstebro & Thompson, 2011; Lazear, 2004), and the role 
of expertise to sociological topics like homophily (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001) 
generalized reciprocity (Yamagishi, Nobuhito, & Kiyonari, 1999), and social capital (Coleman, 
1988; Putnam, 1993). While the supply of capital has been extensively investigated by scholars in 
economics and finance for decades, it is my belief that economic sociology and organizational 
theory have much to offer when it comes to understanding this crucial component of the 
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entrepreneurial ecosystem, and I hope that my research will pave the way for further work in this 
area.










The literature on embeddedness has emphasized how economic transactions are framed by social relations, highlighting the interaction of social and economic factors in shaping the behavior of individuals and organizations in market settings. When it comes to investor participation in capital markets, however, the social processes that govern entry into such markets have received little scholarly attention, despite their importance for entrepreneurship. In this paper, I address the above issues within the context of entrepreneurial finance by examining the decision by entrepreneurs to become angel investors. In so doing, I leverage a novel dataset that combines biographical and career information about entrepreneurs with data on their investment patterns and the companies they founded. Building on the sociology literature, I show that generalized reciprocity is predictive of the transition to angel investing, in that entrepreneurs are more likely to become angel investors when they have received angel funding themselves in the past. I also find this effect to be stronger under conditions of homophily—i.e. when entrepreneurs and the angels financing them are similar across one or more dimensions. Finally, I show that homophily patterns in venture financing are reproduced as entrepreneurs become angel investors and make their own funding decisions. I conclude by discussing the contributions of my work to the sociology of markets, as well to the scholarly understanding of the dynamics of entrepreneurial ecosystems.    This research was funded in part by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation. The contents of this publication are solely the responsibility of the author. 
   Keywords: angel investors; entrepreneurship; embeddedness; homophily; generalized reciprocity
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A topic of perennial interest within the sociology of financial markets concerns the process through 
which markets are populated—that is, how social actors decide to enter markets to seek exchange 
relationships. But while economic sociology and organizational theory have examined processes 
of entry by consumers of capital—such as organizations entering the stock market through IPOs 
(e.g. Pollock & Rindova, 2003; Pollock, Rindova, & Maggitti, 2008)—as well as their social 
antecedents (Rao, Davis, & Ward, 2000), our disciplines have had relatively less to say about 
suppliers of capital, i.e. the individuals and organizations who enter markets in search of 
investment opportunities. This is likely because the decision to invest in a financial market is, 
under most circumstances, implicitly assumed to be motivated by profit maximization. Indeed, the 
neoclassical theory of investment behavior (e.g. Jorgenson, 1963), which postulates that the main 
goal of the investor is to optimize capital accumulation, seems to have remained largely dominant 
when it comes to explaining investor motives. 
Beginning with Polanyi (1968) and Granovetter (1985), however, theories of market 
functioning have increasingly acknowledged that economic transactions are inextricable from the 
web of social relations in which they are embedded. At the same time, thanks to the growing 
influence of bounded rationality (Simon, 1957, 1991) and prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979), scholars have also come to recognize that market actors often operate in ways that transcend 
simple rationality and economic self-interest. We can therefore reasonably expect entry by 
suppliers of capital to be influenced by social ties—and indeed, the finance literature provides 
some early evidence that this is the case, in that stock market participation has consistently been 
found to be a function of social influence (Brown, Ivković, Smith, & Weisbenner, 2008; Hong, 
Kubik, & Stein, 2004; Kaustia & Knüpfer, 2012). In a similar fashion, just like consumers of 
capital (e.g. entrepreneurs) are often motivated by non-monetary factors that go beyond profit 
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maximization (Battilana & Lee, 2014), we should expect investors not to be uniquely motivated 
by capital accumulation; the recent emergence of impact investing—i.e. investments meant to 
generate social or environmental impact alongside financial returns—suggests that this is likely 
the case. In this paper, therefore, I aim to contribute to the body of knowledge on the social 
antecedents of market participation by suppliers of capital, as well as to explore the latter’s effect 
on the overall functioning of markets. More specifically, I ask: what social mechanisms affect the 
decision to enter capital markets and become an investor? And how do such processes impact the 
structure of markets as a whole? I examine these questions within the context of venture financing, 
and more specifically by looking into the participation of entrepreneurs in the market for angel 
investments.  
Within entrepreneurial ecosystems, angel investing has come to play a prominent role in 
the process of venture financing, bridging the gap between early “friends-and-family” rounds and 
later rounds dominated by venture capital. Recent empirical findings suggest that angel-funded 
ventures experience superior outcomes compared to those that are not (Kerr, Lerner, & Schoar, 
2014), because angel investors provide mentorship and access to expertise and resources that go 
beyond capital (Huang & Knight, 2017). Yet the motives for participating in the angel investment 
market pose an interesting empirical puzzle. On one hand, many of the most prolific and successful 
angel investors are former entrepreneurs. Indeed, a quantitative analysis by market intelligence 
platform CB Insights revealed that, among the top 20 most influential angel investors based on 
network centrality, more than three quarters are current or former entrepreneurs—including 
popular figures within the field like Max Levchin (PayPal), Marc Benioff (Salesforce), Aaron 
Levie (Box), Jerry Yang (Yahoo!), and Richard Branson (Virgin).1 Overall, estimates suggest that 
                                                          1 https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/top-angel-investors/  
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between 60 and 90 percent of angel investors have entrepreneurial experience (Shane, 2008). 
Because the process of venture financing requires both socialization and tacit knowledge, it is 
certainly no wonder that former entrepreneurs are uniquely positioned to become angel investors. 
At the same time, such levels of participation are puzzling when one considers the evidence that 
angel investing is often relatively unrewarding from a financial standpoint, while requiring high 
levels of personal involvement; indeed, a majority of angel investments earning negative returns 
(Huang & Pearce, 2015) and overall returns lower than those offered by venture capital in most 
cases.2 This begs the question of why certain entrepreneurs decide to take up angel investing, and 
what the mechanisms behind this transition might be. 
In what follows, I leverage well-established constructs drawn from sociology to theorize 
about the process through which entrepreneurs become angel investors. In so doing, I advance the 
idea that the transition to angel investing is at least partly driven by social mechanisms, and that 
long-standing concepts such as generalized reciprocity (Tsvetkova & Macy, 2014; Yamagishi & 
Cook, 1993) and homophily (McPherson et al., 2001) can be appropriate choices to model it. 
Further, I show how these processes might have consequences going beyond the individual that 
receives funding, which in turn perpetuates existing funding arrangements and, by extension, the 
structure of the market. I begin by reviewing extant work on the social determinants of venture 
financing, with particular reference to high-tech entrepreneurship. I then introduce the empirical 
setting and I discuss each of the above ideas in detail, laying out specific hypotheses to be tested 
and my proposed contributions to practice. Finally, I discuss the specifics of my data, which blend 
qualitative information from fieldwork and interviews with quantitative data from archival 
sources; I present my results, and elaborate on the proposed contributions of my work to both the 
                                                          2 http://www.nber.org/digest/may01/w8066.html  
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literature on angel investing and the scholarly understanding of the social antecedents of venture 
financing. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
The problem of market participation. While organizational theory and economic 
sociology have been traditionally concerned with the antecedents of market entry by organizations 
(Haveman, 1993; Jensen, 2003), including participation in capital markets (e.g. Rao et al., 2000), 
the question of why individuals decide to participate in markets has received comparatively less 
attention (although see Yenkey, 2017). This is surprising, especially in light of economic 
sociology’s long-standing interest in the social underpinnings of financial markets (Carruthers & 
Kim, 2011). The finance literature, however, has made strides in this regard, providing convincing 
evidence that—far from being an entirely economic decision—market participation by individuals 
is crucially shaped by social factors, especially for what concerns the decision to become 
stockholders. For instance, Kaustia & Knüpfer (2012) note that peer performance predict stock 
market entry, in that individuals are more likely to participate and buy stocks if local peers have 
done well in the stock market. Similarly, Hong et al. (2004) argue that social interaction is also a 
predictor of market participation, as individuals are more likely to buy stocks when they are more 
socially connected to their peers, and when the latter have higher rates of participation in the stock 
market. While not as prevalent within society as stock market participation, entrepreneurial finance 
provides a useful opportunity to explore the social antecedents of the decision to become an 
investor: in fact, stock market participation is largely faceless and transactional, and there is little 
or no personal involvement on the investor’s part. On the other hand, venture financing—and 
especially angel investing—often requires a personal connection between entrepreneurs and 
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investors, which should make the process more susceptible to social influence and other 
interpersonal dynamics.  
Social dynamics in venture financing. Up to this point, the organizational theory, 
management, and entrepreneurship literatures have extensively looked into the role that social 
connections play in the founding, development, and success of new ventures (Sorenson & Stuart, 
2001, 2008a; Stuart & Sorenson, 2005). Such connections are thought to be important because 
they favor opportunity identification (Kacperczyk, 2013; Renzulli, Aldrich, & Moody, 2000), they 
can aid entrepreneurs in mobilizing resources like financial capital and skilled labor (Hsu, 2004; 
Shane & Stuart, 2002; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001), and they can favor knowledge circulation 
(Sorenson & Audia, 2000). In all, extant studies have advanced the view of entrepreneurship as a 
social process, with the decision to become an entrepreneur being conceptualized as partly a 
function of social influence (Kacperczyk, 2013); for instance, socializing with colleagues that have 
entrepreneurial experience in a workplace setting has been found to favor the transition to 
entrepreneurship (Nanda & Sørensen, 2010). Entrepreneurs are also likely to base their founding 
choices on their extended social network, e.g. by choosing the location of their ventures based on 
where their family and friends live (Dahl & Sorenson, 2010). 
For what concerns venture financing more specifically, it has long been acknowledged that 
social considerations explain a substantial share of the variance in partnership decisions: for 
instance, investors who share ethnic, educational or career background are more likely to form 
syndicates (Gompers, Mukharlyamov, & Xuah, 2016).3 Most of the extant studies on the social 
antecedents of venture financing, however, have focused on either investment performance or the 
decision to co-invest as dependent variables. As an example, Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu (2007) 
                                                          3 Interestingly enough though, Gompers et al. (2016) also find that investments made under conditions of homophily—i.e. in partnership with similar others—tend to earn comparatively lower profits.  
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provide evidence that venture capital firms with more extensive networks of contacts are more 
likely to experience better fund performance, while Hegde & Tumlinson (2014) find that ethnic 
proximity between VCs and the start-ups they invest in is positively related to the probability of a 
successful exit. Pre-founding social ties to established actor in the field were also associated with 
a higher success for entrepreneurial ventures (Roberts & Sterling, 2012). In a similar fashion, Ter 
Wal, Alexy, Block, & Sandner (2016) examine the effect of investors’ social capital on the success 
of their portfolio ventures, finding that syndicates with open-specialized or closed-diverse 
networks are more likely to do well (see also Westlund & Bolton, 2003 for the role of social capital 
in entrepreneurship). Social proximity is also found to be relevant: in a study of the U.S. venture 
capital industry, Hegde & Tumlinson (2014) find that not only are VCs more likely to select co-
ethnic investment partners, but that ethnic proximity between VCs and the startups they invest in 
is positively related to the probability of success (defined as exit via acquisition or IPO).  
It must also be noted, however, that the majority of the existing studies to date have largely 
focused on venture capital, while neglecting less formalized funding arrangements such as those 
prevalent in early-stage financing. This is almost certainly a byproduct of data availability (or the 
lack thereof), as detailed funding information is readily available for venture capital from 
commercial databases such as VentureSource and VentureXpert, while angel and friends-and-
family investments are typically not reported, as they are not subjected to regulatory disclosure 
requirements. While former entrepreneurs are also quite prevalent among venture capitalists, they 
make up an even higher share of angel investors; this is because many venture capitalists have an 
investment banking background, rather than entrepreneurship background—which is 
comparatively less common among angel investors. By looking at the transition from 
entrepreneurship to angel investing, therefore, I intend to overcome the relatively narrow focus of 
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the extant literature on just two dependent variables—performance and syndicate formation—
while at the same time devoting empirical attention to angel investing, a phenomenon that is both 
underinvestigated (to date) and increasingly consequential for entrepreneurial outcomes (Kerr et 
al., 2014). In the next section, therefore, I discuss the features of angel investing in the United 
States as an empirical setting. 
Angel investing in the United States. Angel investing has grown in importance and 
visibility in the past decade, both in the United States and in other nations, developed and 
developing alike (Lerner, Schoar, Sokolinski, & Wilson, 2016). While the size of the angel market 
is difficult to estimate due to the lack of official figures, in the United States it was believed to be 
as big as the venture capital market in 2004: indeed, based on official figures business angels 
invested $23 billion in young companies, while venture capitalists invested about $20 billion. In 
2014, after the global financial crisis, the total U.S. angel market was estimated to be worth $24.1 
billion. In the past few years, angel investing has shown strong growth trends all over the world, 
with the European angel market doubling in size and the Canadian one tripling.4 
According to Shane (2008: 14), “an angel investor is a person who provides capital, in the 
form of debt or equity, from his own funds to a private business owned and operated by someone 
else, who is neither a friend nor a family member”. In this regard, angel investors differ from 
venture capitalists, who typically do not invest their own money, and from friends-and-family 
investors, who provide capital to business run by family or other acquaintances. Contrary to 
popular beliefs, not all angel investors in the United States are located in Silicon Valley or in New 
York; while there is undoubtedly a degree of concentration around these two main metropolitan 
                                                          4 http://www.kauffman.org/blogs/policy-dialogue/2016/march/the-rise-of-angel-investing  
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areas, angel investors can be found all over the country, and many of them invest locally.5 Many 
angel investors are also not “wealthy” in the conventional sense: based on 2004 data from the 
Entrepreneurship in the United States Assessment, the majority of angel investors (66.7 percent) 
fail to meet the $1 million minimum net worth required for SEC accreditation, and while 16.7 
percent have a net worth over $2 million, just as many angel investors apparently have a negative 
net worth. While most angel investors—have discussed—have entrepreneurial experience, with 
88 percent of them having started at least a company, they typically do not have more 
entrepreneurial experience than other informal investors; furthermore, most angel investors tend 
to be inexperienced investors. Finally, while most angel investors are white men, ethnic minorities 
tend to be overrepresented in angel investing relative to the general population, and women are 
just as likely as men to be business angels once other variables are accounted for. In all, the picture 
of angel investing in the United States does not fit the usual stereotype of the Silicon Valley 
millionaire leveraging his or her extensive entrepreneurial experience; rather, it is quite vibrant 
and diverse. 
 Why do angel investors decide to provide funding to entrepreneurs and their nascent 
ventures? Conventional wisdom suggests that the economic motive is the dominant force; that is, 
most angel investors decide to fund nascent ventures primarily to make money. In a survey of 230 
business angels in Germany, Stedler & Peters (2003) find support for this assertion, in that the 
desire to earn money and achieve superior returns was generally listed among the top four reasons 
for investing. It is not clear, however, whether angel investing is an effective way to achieve this 
vis-à-vis other types of investments. Indeed, recent evidence suggests that the returns to angel 
investing are “all but heavenly”, with about half of all angel investments losing money and 48% 
                                                          5 Source: 2008 ACA Angel Group Confidence Survey (http://tinyurl.com/j8kymlw) 
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of investments resulting in a 100% loss.6 An empirical analysis of risk-adjusted returns on 
investment (ROI) as a function of funding stage 7 reveals that there is an inverted U-shape 
relationship between funding stage and risk-adjusted returns, so that returns are highest in Series 
A and B but lowest at earlier and later stages of funding. Because an overwhelming majority of 
angel investments occur at the seed stage, it is therefore reasonable to assume that they are on 
average less profitable than other forms of investments in new ventures. Moreover, the vast 
majority of the profits from angel investing appear to be concentrated at the top, in the hands of 
well-connected veterans of high-growth industries. On the other hand, angels with less capital to 
offer and weaker links to expert advice are not especially likely to see high returns. This begs the 
question of why entrepreneurs might choose to pursue angel investing over other, possibly more 
lucrative opportunities. Otherwise stated, while the profit motive is certainly compelling, given the 
overwhelming odds of failure faced by most angel investors it stands to reason that it might be at 
best a partial explanation, and that other motivations of a different nature might come into play, 
too. In the following sections, therefore, I explore possible social antecedents of entrepreneurs’ 
decision to pursue angel investing, drawing on well-established constructs from the sociology 
literature.   
 
Generalized exchange in angel investing. 
"In the order of nature we cannot render benefits to those from whom we receive them, or only seldom. But the benefit we receive must be rendered again, line for line, deed for deed, cent for cent, to somebody." —Ralph Waldo Emerson  
                                                          6 http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125694047773419513  7 https://medium.com/@DunRobinVentures/evaluating-the-risk-reward-relationship-across-funding-rounds-5c951f21236b#.fvij6po3v  
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If angel investing does not earn much money8— and according to some, it is no better than 
gambling9— then why do entrepreneurs do it? Huang & Pearce (2015) suggest that the decision to 
invest is often based on intuitive-emotional reasoning, with social cues being a substantive 
component. Many angel investors enjoy the interpersonal component of what they do— as 
opposed to relatively transactional, arm’s length form of investments such as the stock market— 
as exemplified by the following quote by an angel investor: 
 “There are other areas where it might be easier or more lucrative to make good investments, like real estate or the stock market […] But I think what makes a difference here is the human component. […] It’s that human element that really makes it more interesting for everybody. How can I help this human being leverage what they’ve done and create something new?”  
These arguments are also reflected in the existing literature on the topic. In his discussion 
of angel investment patterns in the United States, Shane (2008) lists a variety of reasons: while 
some—such as making money or learning new things—can be seen as self-interested, others, like 
helping a friend or supporting their communities, are remarkably prosocial. Indeed, these prosocial 
reasons often trump economic motives. In the words of a professional investor: 
In case you’re interested, I make one or two angel investments each year, but I don’t do it to make money. […] I make those few angel investments because I want to help my best students achieve their goals, and because I like being involved in startups. That’s the ultimate lesson from the fish stories in Silicon Valley. True fishermen cast their lines not because they want the fish, but because they like fishing. It’s fine to be an angel investor – just don’t do it for the money.10  
                                                          8 https://techcrunch.com/2012/10/13/angel-investors-make-2-5x-returns-overall/  9 http://www.forbes.com/sites/dileeprao/2014/02/10/whats-riskier-angel-investing-or-gambling-in-vegas/#9601403e3b35  10 https://techcrunch.com/2012/09/30/why-angel-investors-dont-make-money-and-advice-for-people-who-are-going-to-become-angels-anyway/   
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This passage highlights how, for many angel investors, at the heart of their business lies the “desire 
to give something back to a place that has supported them in some way” (Shane, 2008: 23-28)—
or, in other words, to pay it forward.  
In sociology, this notion is generally known as reciprocity, i.e. the idea that people will 
behave towards each other in similar ways—for instance, responding to amicable behavior with 
similar benevolence of their own, while responding to aggression with retaliation. While 
reciprocity traditionally refers to one-on-one interaction, it can also be expanded in scope through 
the concept of generalized exchange (Yamagishi & Cook, 1993). Generalized exchange occurs 
when an individual feels obliged to reciprocate another’s action, not by directly rewarding his 
benefactor, but by benefiting another actor. Generalized exchange has been associated with the 
emergence of solidarity (Molm, Collett, & Schaefer, 2007; Willer, Flynn, & Zak, 2012), and recent 
experimental results by Tsvetkova & Macy (2014) show that receiving generosity significantly 
increases the likelihood to be generous towards strangers.  
For what concerns the dynamics at work on our empirical setting, I argue that generalized 
exchange dynamics such as the ones described above will come into play when entrepreneurs 
receive funding from angel investors. In fact, receiving a tangible contribution from an angel 
investor is likely to trigger the pay-it-forward mechanism, thereby encouraging entrepreneurs to 
become business angels themselves.11 Formally stated: 
 
Proposition 1. Receiving funding from angel investors will make entrepreneurs more likely to 
become angel investors themselves, relative to receiving funding entirely from other sources. 
 
                                                          11 https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/243759  
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In the remainder of the theory section, I explore the scope conditions of generalized reciprocity 
as it pertains to angel investing.  
Homophily and in-group favoritism. Human behavior is characterized by homophily 
(McPherson et al., 2001); i.e. by the tendency to associate with others that are similar to us. 
Historically, this tendency towards homophily has resulted in inequality in organizations and 
markets alike; venture financing is no exception. For instance, empirical evidence suggests that 
startup ideas pitched by men are more likely to get funded, because most investors are men 
(Brooks, Huang, Kearney, & Murray, 2014). Similarly, women are also at a disadvantage in that 
they tend to get fewer business referrals in male-dominated fields (Abraham, 2014). Other 
characteristics such as local affiliations can often drive homophily, as well (Dahl & Sorenson, 
2012): in China, for example, returnee entrepreneurs with school ties within the local community 
were found to do better than entrepreneurs with no such ties (Obukhova, Wang, & Li, 2013). 
Shared affiliations such as these can create common ground that makes the development of social 
interaction more likely (McPherson et al., 2001). Similar dynamics are arguably at work in angel 
investing,12 as well: in a recent article, Mitteness, DeJordy, Ahuja, & Sudek (2016) found that there 
is a general tendency for angel investors to team up with demographically similar others.  
Here, I extend this line of inquiry by suggesting that homophily will moderate the 
generalized reciprocity dynamics described in the previous section; in practical terms, company 
founders will be especially likely to become angel investors if they received angel funding from 
individuals that are similar to them. This argument resonates with the existing literature on the 
subject: for instance, Chiang & Takahashi (2011) found that ties among members of a social group 
                                                          12 http://www.forbes.com/sites/geristengel/2014/05/28/entrepreneurship-and-angel-investing-are-breaking-barriers-for-women/#79c627c01ccc  
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favor the emergence of generalized exchange within the group, which goes to show that being 
connected with individuals that are similar to us is a strong predictor of pay-it-forward reciprocity. 
Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) also supports the idea that individuals tend to treat 
members of their in-group more favorably. This phenomenon, typically known as in-group 
favoritism (Billig & Tajfel, 1973), makes individuals more likely to behave favorably towards 
members of groups that define their own social identity (such as race,  gender, or school/workplace 
affiliations); in turn, receiving a favor from an in-group member makes generalized reciprocity 
more likely to take place (Yamagishi et al., 1999). Finally, recent developments in social network 
analysis support the idea that homophily can be instrumental in favoring the diffusion of behavior 
through social connections (Aral, Muchnik, & Sundararajan, 2009; Centola, 2011). Based on the 
above arguments, I would expect entrepreneurs who receive funding from individuals similar to 
them to be especially likely to pay it forward by providing angel funding to others. While this 
argument is likely to apply broadly to a wide range of socioeconomic characteristics, including 
race, occupation, and social class, hereafter I focus on variables that can be realistically measured 
with our data: gender, school ties, and location. I discuss each of these in detail below.  
Gender.  
“I decided to join a specialized angel group because, as a woman, I knew that if I did not invest in women, no one else would. And my hope is that if I do that, then maybe one day they will eventually do the same and finance other women, too.”  
In the extant literature, gender effects have been shown to be pervasive in organizations and market 
settings, as well as in entrepreneurship more specifically. For starters, there exists a well-known 
gender gap in entrepreneurship, which reinforces the perception of the latter as a male-dominated 
field: indeed, in the United States only 20.5 percent of employer firms are owned by female 
entrepreneurs, compared to 64.5 percent that are owned by male entrepreneurs and 15 percent that 
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are equally owned, according to the 2014 Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs.13 In addition, because 
entrepreneurship involves risk-taking to a degree which often clashes with traditional gender roles, 
women have traditionally been either reluctant or unable to pursue it; moreover, the lack of 
supportive institutions such as childcare or paid family leave may pose an additional hurdle 
(Thebaud, 2015).  
While there is an extensive literature on gender homophily (Ruef, Aldrich, & Carter, 2003), 
and by extension sex segregation, in the workplace (e.g. Bielby & Baron, 1986; Dezso, Ross, & 
Uribe, 2016; Ibarra, 1992), the literature on gender effects in entrepreneurship is in its infancy 
(Aldrich, 1989; Stuart & Sorenson, 2007). Some notable instances of research in this area include 
Brooks et al. (2014), who found that investors show a preference for pitches by male entrepreneurs 
vis-à-vis pitches made by female entrepreneurs, and all the more so if the former are more 
attractive; Abraham (2014), who showed that female entrepreneurs receive fewer benefits from 
social capital and networking than male entrepreneurs; and Greenberg & Mollick (2017), who 
found gender homophily to be a key factor in crowdfunding dynamics, so that individuals are more 
likely to crowdfund ventures founded by individual whom they perceive to be like them, a fact 
which leads to women financing other women more frequently.  
For what pertains to this paper and its theoretical framework, and based on the arguments 
made in the previous section, I will argue that—ceteris paribus—generalized reciprocity will be 
moderated by gender homophily, so that entrepreneurs will be more likely to become angel 
investors when they are financed by an angel investors of the same gender. Indeed, because 
individuals are more likely to imitate the behavior of those they perceive as similar—which in our 
case triggers generalized reciprocity—I would expect entrepreneurs to be more likely to follow the 
                                                          13 http://www.kauffman.org/blogs/growthology/2016/09/the-gender-gap-remains-large  
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example of the business angels who are similar to them along one or more dimensions. And since 
gender has been extensively shown to be a key dimension of homophily (McPherson et al., 2001), 
entrepreneurs should be comparatively more likely to transition to angel investing when they are 
financed by someone of their same gender. More formally:  
 
Proposition 2a. Entrepreneurs will be more likely to become angel investors when they receive 
angel funding from investors of their same gender, relative to: a) baseline; b) entrepreneurs 
whose angel investors are of the opposite gender. 
 
School ties.  
“…when people are connected by an affinity—alumni groups, for example—they are flat-out more willing to help one another. […] Somebody who sold a company for a billion dollars is infinitely more likely to serve on a board of a seed company when they share a common bond.”  
The second of these variables is the presence of a school tie, i.e. whether entrepreneurs and the 
angel investors founding their ventures attended the same educational institution. Shared 
organizational foci among individuals—such as a common workplace, or educational institution—
have long been recognized as inducing friendship, shared attitudes, and behavioral homophily 
(McPherson et al., 2001); in other words, individuals are especially likely to socialize with, and 
behave similarly to, people with whom they share such affiliations. For instance, Galaskiewicz & 
Shatin (1981) found that shared committee memberships had a strong effect on patterns of co-
voting. Kacperczyk (2013) traced back the decision to enter entrepreneurship to the social 
influence exerted by one’s university peers.14 In all, individuals are especially likely to mimic the 
                                                          14 See also Lerner & Malmendier (2013). 
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behavior of others with whom they share one or more organizational foci. For this reasons, I would 
argue that when an entrepreneur’s ventures are financed by a business angel, the presence of a 
school tie between the entrepreneur and investor will increase the likelihood of generalized 
reciprocity being triggered, thereby favoring the entrepreneurs’ transition to angel investing. More 
formally: 
 
Proposition 2b. Entrepreneurs will be more likely to become angel investors when they receive 
angel funding from investors that went to their same school, relative to: a) baseline; b) 
entrepreneurs whose angel investors did not go to the same school as them. 
 
Location.  
“Not only is investing locally more convenient, but it is also a way for me to give back and contribute to the New York ecosystem, which has given me so much.”  
A third and final variable of interest here is location. The importance of entrepreneurs’ “social 
attachment to place” is well documented in the organizational literature (Dahl & Sorenson, 2010, 
2012). Entrepreneurs in fact rely on a broad set of local ties: these include family and friends for 
social support, as well as professional connections that help them to gather the resources they need 
to succeed (Dahl & Sorenson, 2009), including venture funding. Because entrepreneurs build on 
the local community in both their personal and professional lives, they are bound to experience an 
increased sense of obligation when they receive assistance from sources within the community. 
Conversely, when they receive funding from an investor located elsewhere they are more likely to 
frame the transaction in purely economic terms, which will not elicit the same desire to “pay it 
forward”. Therefore, I would argue that when an entrepreneur is financed by a business angel 
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hailing from the same area, he or she will feel compelled to give back to the community, and thus 
be more inclined to become an angel investor in turn. More formally: 
 
Proposition 2c. Entrepreneurs will be more likely to become angel investors when they receive 
angel funding from investors that are located in their same metropolitan area, relative to: a) 
baseline; b) entrepreneurs whose angel investors are not co-located. 
 
The reproduction of homophily in angel investing. After examining the antecedents of 
entry into angel investing, I now turn to the following question: how does the pattern of angel 
investments received by entrepreneurs affect the patterns of angel investment made by the 
entrepreneurs, once they transition to angel investing? Here, I will argue that if venture financing 
relationships are characterized by homophily, then similarly homophilous investment patterns 
should be observed once the entrepreneurs who received angel funding transition to angel investing 
themselves. In other words, I would expect venture funding choices to be reproduced across 
generations of entrepreneurs. In this regard, the organizational literature provides ample evidence 
for the social reproduction of individual decisions, most notably for what pertains to occupational 
choices and hiring. With respect to the former, beginning with Blau, Gustad, Jessor, Parnes, & 
Wilcock (1956), scholars have increasingly linked occupational choices with social influence, 
arguing that parental role models, as well as influence from mentors and teachers, often play a 
significant role in shaping the careers that individuals pursue. In a similar fashion, studies of 
homosocial reproduction (Kanter, 1977; Rivera, 2013) have shown that gender imbalances in the 
workplace are reproduced because people tend to select individuals who are similar to themselves. 
Because social similarity breeds trust and makes the establishment of social ties less risky and 
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more predictable, homophily emerges as a significant predictor of selection and promotion 
decisions within organizations. More recent work has highlighted the same dynamics in the context 
of hiring decisions (Rivera, 2012), showcasing how managers show a preference for candidates 
who are culturally similar to themselves—a process which in turn reproduces organizational 
culture and ensures its stability over time. At a societal level, dynamics such as these have been 
associated with the maintenance_ of elite power structures and inequality, as well (Khan, 2012; 
Rivera, 2015). 
For what pertains to the empirical setting at hand, I advance the argument that because 
angel investing is a process that requires socialization, entrepreneurs are likely to be influenced by 
the style and preferences of angel investors who finance them to a significant degree. Because 
individuals are likely to imitate socially proximate alters (Coleman, Katz, & Menzel, 1957; 
Kacperczyk, 2013), under conditions of homophily the similarities between angel investor and 
founder are likely to be reproduced in the investments made by the latter. More specifically, 
entrepreneurs who are financed by angel investors of the same gender might become more prone 
to do the same, based on the homosocial reproduction arguments discussed above (Kanter, 1977). 
The same line of argument applies to receiving funding from someone within an alumni network 
as well, because having attended the same educational institution creates shared ground which also 
favors the reproduction of homophily, making entrepreneurs more inclined to look within the 
network for investment opportunities. And in the case of co-location, receiving funding from an 
angel investor within the community can also engender feelings of indebtedness, which in turn 
might make the entrepreneur more prone to finance other local entrepreneurs down the line. 
Mirroring my earlier arguments concerning homophily as a reciprocity moderator, therefore, I will 
argue that when an entrepreneur is financed by an angel investor who is either: a) of the same 
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gender; b) an alumnus of the same school as the entrepreneur; c) co-located, he or she will be more 
likely to finance other entrepreneurs with the same traits. More formally:  
 
Proposition 3a. Entrepreneurs who received angel funding from investors who are of their same 
gender will be more likely to provide angel funding to entrepreneurs of the same gender.  
 
Proposition 3b. Entrepreneurs who received angel funding from investors who went to their 
same university will be more likely to provide angel funding to entrepreneurs who went to their 
same university. 
 
Proposition 3c. Entrepreneurs who received angel funding from investors that are located in 
their same metropolitan area will be more likely to provide angel funding to entrepreneurs 
within the same metropolitan area. 
 
DATA AND VARIABLES  
 Quantitative data. The primary data for this study come from Crunchbase, an online data 
source for information about new high-tech ventures, venture capital and notable individuals in 
the startup ecosystem (such as founders and investors). I used Crunchbase primarily to: 1) identify 
all VC-backed tech startups in the United States;15 2) create a list of all the entrepreneurs who 
founded these companies; 3) identify angel investments made by entrepreneurs in the sample. 
                                                          15 Choosing to focus the analysis on VC-backed entrepreneurs provides a useful way to limit the size of the sample, as collecting LinkedIn data is expensive and the available information is likely to be of higher quality for those ventures that have been backed by venture capital at some point.  
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Table 1 reports a summary of the information that can be gathered from CrunchBase about 
individuals, organizations, and funding rounds. 
 
-------------------------- Insert Table 1.1 about here -------------------------- 
 
With respect to existing datasets that have been used to study entrepreneurship and venture capital, 
Crunchbase is unique in that it relies on crowdsourcing, whose main advantages include diversity 
and timeliness of information, as well as broader coverage. However, unlike other crowdsourced 
platforms—such as Wikipedia—contributions are carefully examined by the editorial staff to 
ensure the accuracy and quality of each data point. Furthermore, while most commonly used 
datasets only collect data from a limited set of investors or startups, CrunchBase has a broader 
scope of coverage because it triangulates data from multiple sources including press releases, SEC 
filings, and venture databases (Ter Wal et al., 2016; Wang, Pahnke, & McDonald, 2018). While 
CrunchBase’s coverage of companies and funding rounds is extensive, however, its main 
downside of CrunchBase is a paucity of information on individuals—investors and entrepreneurs 
alike. To remedy this latter shortcoming of my primary data source, for each entrepreneur I then 
collected additional data from LinkedIn, including information about career history, educational 
affiliations, and location.16 I also used this data to match entrepreneurs, startups, and universities 
to the respective Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA)—as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau. 
While the majority of past work has relied on small samples or anecdotal data, Crunchbase will 
allow me to test my hypotheses on a sample of approximately 10,000 domestic entrepreneurs who 
founded companies in the United States between the 1990s and the present day whose ventures 
                                                          16 Because LinkedIn does not allow automated scraping of their data, this information had to be collected manually. 
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were funded—among others—by about 2,700 unique angel investors; such a large sample is bound 
to strengthen the reliability and generalizability of my results in a substantial manner. Further, the 
integration of Crunchbase and LinkedIn—which provides information about each founder’s 
education and career trajectory—results in a dataset of unprecedented size, depth, and scope. 
 Interview data and fieldwork. In addition to the archival data described above, to gain a 
more in-depth knowledge of the market for angel investment I sought to incorporate qualitative 
data in the form of interviews and fieldwork. With respect to the former, I conducted 15 interviews 
with angel investors: my sample primarily comprises individuals based in New York City and the 
Tri-State metropolitan area, although I was also able to interview angels based in other areas of 
the country, such as the San Francisco Bay Area, Boston, and Atlanta. These interviews were used 
primarily to inform hypothesis development and to gather qualitative evidence on those theoretical 
mechanisms that are not easily tested by means of regression analysis. Moreover, I also attended 
several angel investor meetings in New York City, which were helpful both to gain further 
interview contacts through snowball sampling and to strike informal conversations with angel 
investors about their career, interests, and expertise. Attending angel group meetings regularly also 
allowed me to observe angel investors and entrepreneurs interacting “in the wild” during pitches, 
to explore the socialization patterns among angels with different professional backgrounds, as well 
as to gain insights concerning the various activities that angel investors normally engage in—either 
alone or in groups—such as due diligence, following up with entrepreneurs, and “deep dives” into 
specific investment opportunities. Finally, in May 2017 I also had the chance to take part in the 
Angel Capital Association Annual Meeting, the largest meeting of angel investors in the world. In 
so doing, I had a chance to interact with angel investors from several different countries, as well 
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as get acquainted with the various aspects of angel investing that, as a layman, I was originally not 
familiar with. 
Methods. As for the choice of empirical models, I test Propositions 1, 2a, 2b, and 2c by 
means of event-history models—and more specifically, Cox proportional hazard models—to the 
population of tech entrepreneurs identified through Crunchbase. As the main focus of the study is 
the transition from entrepreneurship to angel investing, entrepreneurs are assumed to enter the 
sample when they found their first venture and exit it when they make their first angel investment. 
In this regard, testing Proposition 1 would entail assessing whether receiving angel funding—
operationalized as the number of investments by individuals that the entrepreneur’s ventures have 
received—has an impact on an entrepreneur’s likelihood to take up angel investing. As far as 
Propositions 2a, 2b, 2c are concerned, they require exploring whether homophily—operationalized 
through gender, co-location and school ties—moderates the relationship described in Proposition 
1, which can be easily tested through interaction effects. Entrepreneurs are assumed to enter the 
observation window in the year in which they found their first company, and they exit the sample 
either when they make their first angel investment or in 2015, whenever is later.17 As I am 
interested in what makes entrepreneurs decide to take up angel investing, as opposed to established 
investors who found companies, I excluded from the sample those entrepreneurs that began angel 
investing before founding their first company. Also, I consider all investments in startup 
companies that were made by individuals as angel investments, regardless of how they are coded 
in CrunchBase, provided that the individuals did not invest in their own company. This is because 
there seems to be a substantial amount of variance in how early funding rounds are named,18 so for 
                                                          17 Because the data were collected in 2016, my observation window ends in 2015. Further, because CrunchBase coverage is spotty before 1995, I begin observing entrepreneurs in 1995. 18 http://qz.com/124206/hey-startups-naming-your-funding-round-wrong-could-cost-you-millions/  
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the purposes of this analysis angel investments are defined as investments in private companies 
made by individuals, regardless of stage or funding round label (Shane, 2008). On the other hand, 
I only consider investments made by individuals as angel investments; in so doing, I deliberately 
exclude syndicates such as angel groups. Here, the dependent variable in all models is the 
probability to transition to angel investment. For what concerns independent variables, for 
Proposition 1 the relevant variable is the number of investments made by angel investors that were 
received by the focal entrepreneur’s ventures, operationalized as a simple count. For Proposition 
2a, the independent variable used is the number of investments received by angel investors of the 
same gender as the entrepreneur. Proposition 2b’s relevant independent variable is instead the 
number of investments received by the focal entrepreneur’s ventures that were made by an investor 
who attended the same school as the entrepreneur, which allows me to test for the effect of school 
ties. Finally, Proposition 2c can be tested by means of a count for the number of investments 
received by the focal entrepreneur’s ventures that were made by an investor who is located within 
the same MSA. To rule out potential confounders, I also include a number of controls in my 
analysis. First, to account for the fact that female entrepreneurs might exhibit different inclinations 
toward angel investing than male entrepreneurs, I include a dummy variable for gender of the 
entrepreneur whose value is 1 for females and 0 for males. Second, to disentangle the effect of 
angel investing vis-à-vis funding by other sources, I include a variable for the number of 
investments made by organizations (such as VCs and other funds) in the entrepreneur’s ventures. 
Moreover, because the educational background of entrepreneurs is likely to influence their 
investing choices as well as the decision to become business angels, I include dummies for whether 
the entrepreneur majored in business or a STEM subject. Furthermore, the decision to become an 
investor is likely a function of the entrepreneurs’ past success; to account for this, I include a set 
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of variables pertaining to the entrepreneurial experience of the focal founder: a) number of founded 
companies; b) number of founded companies that went public; c) number of founded companies 
that were acquired; d) number of founded companies that closed. Regrettably, I do not have 
information about the personal wealth of individual entrepreneurs, but I am hopeful that the latter 
will be adequately proxied by the above variables, as these are strong correlates of both 
entrepreneurial and financial success. Finally, because more successful investors could 
conceivably be more likely to “spawn” new angel investors by financing ventures that are 
especially likely to succeed, I include some of the angel investors’ characteristics as controls: a 
count of the companies founded by the angel investors founding the focal entrepreneur that 1) were 
acquired; 2) went public. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for these variables, as well as 
their bivariate correlations.  
 
-------------------------- Insert Table 1.2 about here -------------------------- 
 
For what concerns Propositions 3a, 3b, and 3c, the dependent variables are the number of 
investments made by the entrepreneurs in the sample towards: a) ventures founded by other 
entrepreneurs of the same gender; b) ventures founded by entrepreneurs that went to the same 
school as the focal founder; c) ventures founded by entrepreneurs that are located within the same 
geographical area as the focal founder. Because the dependent variables are counts, and because 
their mean does not equal their variance—thereby violating one of the key assumptions of Poisson 
regression—I test these propositions using panel negative binomial models. Here, the relevant 
independent variables here are count variables for the number of investments received from: a) 
angels who are of the same gender; b) angels who went to the same university as the focal founder; 
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c) angels that are located within the same metropolitan area as the focal founder. Moreover, these 
models include the same control variables previously reported, although all independent variables 
and some control variables had to be orthogonalized through a modified Gram-Schmidt 
orthogonalization procedures to avoid multicollinearity issues, since they were found to be highly 
correlated. Descriptive statistics for these variables, as well as their bivariate correlations, are 
reported in Table 3. 
 
-------------------------- Insert Table 1.3 about here -------------------------- 
 
RESULTS  
-------------------------- Insert Table 1.4 about here -------------------------- 
 
For what concerns the first part of the study, my model results are reported in Table 4. Model 1 
includes just the basic control variables, while Model 2 adds the variable for funding received by 
organizations, and Model 3 adds the first independent variable, i.e. the number of angel 
investments received. The coefficient for the latter is positive and significant, indicating that a unit 
increase in the number of angel investments received by founders makes their chances of becoming 
angel investors increase by 16.4 percent relative to baseline. Further, receiving funding from an 
organization only improves the odds by 3.3 percent, indicating that angel funding is more likely to 
trigger generalized reciprocity than funding from other sources. In this model, it is also interesting 
to note how gender has a significant and negative effect, indicating that, on average, female 
entrepreneurs are 48.4 percent less likely than male entrepreneurs to become angel investors. The 
model also shows that more successful entrepreneurs, with success measured through IPOs and 
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acquisitions, are more likely to become angel investors, presumably because of the wealth that 
likely resulted from such events. Interestingly enough, entrepreneurs’ education characteristics 
appear to be relevant, as well: STEM-educated founders and founders holding more advanced 
degrees, other things being equal, appear to be less likely to become angel investors.19  
To test the gender homophily assertion in Proposition 2a, Model 4 includes the first 
independent variable, i.e. the number of investments received by the founder from investors that 
are of the same gender. The coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that a unit increase 
in the number of investments received from angels of the same gender increases the odds of the 
focal founder becoming an angel investor by 26.8 percent relative to baseline. Furthermore, a Z-
test (Clogg, Petkova, & Haritou, 1995) reveals that this coefficient is significantly different from 
the one reported in Model 3 for the number of angel investments received, which shows that the 
presence of gender homophily magnifies the effect of reciprocity on the likelihood of becoming 
an angel investor, as predicted. In all, this pattern of results is consistent with the gender homophily 
hypothesis. Model 5 adds the number of angel investments received from investors having a school 
tie with the founder. Once again, the coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that an 
additional investment received by someone that the entrepreneur went to school with improves the 
odds of the latter becoming an angel investor by 59.3 ; once again, a Z-test reveals that this 
coefficient is significantly greater than the one reported in Model 3. Finally, Model 6 adds the final 
variable: the number of investments received by investors located within the same MSA. Once 
again, the coefficient is positive and significant, which suggests that receiving funding from a co-
located investor improves the odds of the focal founder becoming an angel investor by 43.5—like 
in the case of the previous two coefficients, this one is also significantly different from the one in 
                                                          19 This table does not include a full model because the last four variables in the table are highly correlated. 
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Model 3. It is possible, however, that these results might be at least partially driven by factors 
specific to the entrepreneurial ecosystems or the communities in which startups are located. To 
account for such unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity at the local level, I also coded MSA 
(Metropolitan Statistical Area) dummies for each of the founders, and ran separate models that 
include them. These results, reported in Table 5, do not differ significantly from those previously 
reported, so it is reasonable to assume that our results are not driven by community-specific factors. 
 
-------------------------- Insert Table 1.5 about here -------------------------- 
 
For what concerns Propositions 3a, 3b, and 3c, I ran three separate sets of panel negative binomial 
models with three different dependent variables: 1) the number of investments made by the 
entrepreneurs in the sample towards founders of the same gender; 2) the number of investments 
made by the entrepreneurs in the sample towards founders with whom they have school ties; 3) 
the number of investments made by the entrepreneurs in the sample towards founders in the same 
MSA. These are reported in Tables 6, 7, and 8. 
 
-------------------------- Insert Tables 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8 about here -------------------------- 
 
In each of these tables, the first model reports just basic controls, while the second model adds the 
number of investments by organizations and the third the number of investments by angels. 
Finally, the fourth model adds the independent variable of interest. Table 6 and 8 show coefficients 
that are positive and significant, indicating that: a) entrepreneurs who were financed by angel 
investors of their same gender were more likely to finance other entrepreneurs of the same gender; 
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and b) entrepreneurs who were financed by co-located investors were more likely to finance other 
entrepreneurs within the same MSA. The same does not hold, however, in the case of school ties.  
Overall, all propositions are supported with the exception of Proposition 3b. While no 
conclusions can be drawn about the effect of school tie homophily on the likelihood of financing 
other entrepreneurs within the same alumni network, I would conjecture that the lack of statistical 
power might be a factor here, given it is extremely rare to observe the (less than a thousand) 




While angel investing is arguably a consequential phenomenon for both venture financing and 
entrepreneurial ecosystems at large (Kerr et al., 2014), it has received surprisingly scarce attention 
from entrepreneurship scholars so far. And while this lack of attention is most likely a byproduct 
of data availability, which is in turn due to the informal nature of many angel investments, further 
research is both warranted and needed. In this paper, I start from the basic premise that a majority 
of angel investors have entrepreneurial experience to study the process whereby entrepreneurs 
decide to transition to angel investing, relying on well-established sociological constructs such as 
generalized reciprocity and homophily. In so doing, I find support for the basic premise of my 
theory, i.e. that startup founders are more likely to transition to angel investing if they received 
funding from angel investors, relative to other forms of funding, which is consistent with the idea 
of generalized reciprocity. While the effect at a population level is quite small—every additional 
angel investment increases the likelihood of transitioning to angel investing by 16.4 percent, on 
average—the effect is much stronger under conditions of homophily, so that entrepreneurs are 
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more likely to transition to angel investing if they were financed by angel investors who: a) were 
of the same gender; b) went to the same school as the entrepreneur; c) are from the same 
metropolitan area. This is because—I argue—generalized reciprocity is more likely to arise when 
individuals are the direct recipients of generosity,  rather than simple witnesses to it (Tsvetkova & 
Macy, 2014); furthermore, similarity between angel investors and founders across the outlined 
dimensions makes the former’s example more likely to be followed, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of the latter transitioning to angel investing. Additionally, my results show that when 
venture financing is provided under conditions of homophily, entrepreneurs are more likely to 
provide funding to other entrepreneurs along similar lines; while no effect was found for school 
ties, significant results were obtained for co-location and gender. Within the organizational 
literature, this is reminiscent of the literature on imprinting (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013), and it also 
resonates with earlier arguments made concerning gender segregation (Brass, 1985; Ibarra, 1992) 
and the role of co-location (Audia, Freeman, & Davidson, 2006; Davis & Greve, 1997) in the 
diffusion of behaviors. Due to its theoretical scope and empirical setting, I believe this paper makes 
several contributions to both our understanding of entrepreneurial and venture financing dynamics 
and the broader literature on the sociological underpinnings of organizations and markets, which 
I detail below.  
Contributions to the organizational sociology literature. For what pertains to the 
sociology and organizational theory literature, the present study aims to shed light on how well-
established sociological constructs such as homophily (McPherson et al., 2001) and generalized 
reciprocity (Takahashi, 2000) are closely interrelated. Leveraging angel investing as an empirical 
setting, my work does in fact show that generalized reciprocity is more likely to occur under 
conditions of homophily, i.e. when investors and founder are of the same gender, are co-located, 
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or went to the same school. What these seemingly disparate circumstances have in common is that 
they create shared ground between the investors and the founder, magnifying the sense of 
obligation experienced by the individual who receives assistance and contributing to make the 
individual more likely to reciprocate and pay it forward. 
 Additionally, this research could also broadly be of interest to scholars working on the 
topic of careers and, more specifically, on occupational choices and their reproduction (Blau et al., 
1956; Levine, 1976). By showing how generalized reciprocity drives entrepreneurs financed by 
business angels to become angel investors in turn, my work informs theories of career choice by 
highlighting the role played by contextual factors, with specific reference to the exposure to angel 
investing during one’s entrepreneurial career. This is consistent with the long-standing idea that 
occupational choices are determined to a significant degree by exposure to certain professions over 
others, for example through one’s parents (Pablo-Lerchundi, Morales-Alonso, & González-
Tirados, 2015) or peers (Falck, Heblich, & Luedemann, 2012); issues such as these are therefore 
of potential interest to both entrepreneurship scholars (Burton, Sørensen, & Dobrev, 2016; Mungai 
& Velamuri, 2011; Sørensen, 2007) and social scientists more broadly. Further, by highlighting 
the role that homophily plays in the reproduction of occupational choice, this paper also furthers 
theory in this area, underlining the conditions under which certain behaviors are more or less likely 
to be imitated. 
Contributions to entrepreneurship and policy. For what pertains to the entrepreneurship 
field more specifically, my work aims to illuminate the social motivations behind angel investing; 
a topic has received scant attention from entrepreneurship scholars so far, despite the prevalence 
of former entrepreneurs among angel investors. I believe my work makes valuable contributions 
to the entrepreneurship field in that it brings in fresh perspectives from sociology to explain the 
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transition between entrepreneurship and angel investing, which will hopefully result in a more 
robust theory. In so doing, this paper also invites attention to a variety of topics that have received 
scant attention up to this point, including (but not limited to): the relationship between 
entrepreneurs and their ecosystems, the specificities of angel investing vis-à-vis other forms of 
venture financing, and the role that geographic and community factors play in angel investing. 
Furthermore, as far as entrepreneurship policy is concerned, my findings can inform legislation 
designed to catalyze the transition to angel investing, thereby favoring the financing of new 
ventures and spurring economic development. My findings in fact show that—in a way—angel 
investing breeds more angel investing, which in turn results in higher level of overall venture 
financing and, presumably, in more successful ventures, based on Kerr et al.'s (2014) findings; all 
of the above factors, which are very desirable from the local community standpoint, have the 
potential of unleashing the growth of entrepreneurial ecosystems. 
Limitations and directions for future research. As always, the contributions of this study 
must be appreciated in light of its limitations. For instance, the study sample—while large and 
reasonably representative of the high-tech entrepreneurial ecosystem—only comprises those 
startup founders whose ventures have been backed by VC at any point. The sample is therefore 
made up of reasonably successful individuals, who are likely to be wealthier than the general 
population of entrepreneurs, and for this reason they are perhaps more likely to become angel 
investors. On the other hand, the costs involved in the manual LinkedIn data collection, and the 
fact that the information available on Crunchbase is of higher quality for such companies, dictated 
this empirical choice. I have no reason, however, to believe that the pattern of empirical results 
presented here would not hold in the broader entrepreneurial population. Another limitation of the 
data concerns the lack of detailed financial information for individuals and the companies they 
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founded. It could very well be that acquisitions and IPOs that netted more money for the founders 
might boost the odds of the latter becoming angel investors substantially. Nonetheless, I believe 
that controlling for the number of successful acquisitions and IPOs that involve the founder’s 
ventures is a reasonable proxy for the factors described above. Further research could overcome 
this limitation by collecting better data that includes more detailed information on individuals, 
which would also allow for enlarging the sample even further to include individuals who never 
received venture capital funding. 
For what concerns new theoretical avenues of inquiry, scholars could expand on these 
findings by usefully examining the role of other moderating factors in the emergence of 
generalized reciprocity with respect to the transition from entrepreneurship to angel investing. 
Social capital at the community level is of particular interest here, given that extant scholarly work 
has found social capital to be associated with a higher prevalence of entrepreneurship (Kwon, 
Heflin, & Ruef, 2013), because higher levels of social trust and membership in voluntary 
associations facilitate the transition to entrepreneurship. Much in the same way, communities with 
a higher density of nonprofit organizations exhibit a stronger relationship between venture capital 
and innovation (Samila & Sorenson, 2017). Overall, I would expect communities characterized by 
higher levels of social capital—as measured by social trust and participation in nonprofit 
organizations—to provide greater opportunities for generalized reciprocity, as well. In such 
communities—as opposed to communities with lower levels of social capital—I would then expect 
entrepreneurs who received angel funding to be especially likely to become angel investors 
themselves. In fact, social trust facilitates the free flow of information across social groups, 
highlighting the opportunities—rather than the risks—of doing business with others, which will 
encourage angel investing.
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Table 1.1. Summary of information available on CrunchBase. 
Individuals (entrepreneurs/investors) 
Location Companies founded 
Gender Investments 
Date of birth Educations 
Biographical sketch News 
TechCrunch media coverage Event appearances 
Past positions Awards 
Board & advisory roles   
Companies 
Acquisitions Investments 
IPO / Stock Current team 
Location of HQ Board members and advisors 
Company description Products 
Categories Divisions 
Founding date News 
Number of employees Competitors 
TechCrunch media coverage Partners 
Funding rounds Past team 
Investors Event appearances 
Funding rounds 
Funding type Date 
Money raised Investors 
Valuation Related coverage        
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Table 1.2. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for the first part of the study.  
    
   
36  
Table 1.3. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for the second part of the study.  
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Table 1.4. Results for Cox proportional hazards event-history models for the hazard of transitioning.  
DV: hazard of entry into angel investing             
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
              
Gender: female -0.513* -0.484* -0.506* -0.438* -0.478* -0.487* 
 -0.2 -0.2 -0.198 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
Founder education: STEM (dummy) -0.301** -0.355*** -0.343*** -0.352*** -0.354*** -0.357*** 
 -0.093 -0.096 -0.097 -0.096 -0.096 -0.096 
Founder education: business (dummy) -0.131 -0.109 -0.068 -0.1 -0.111 -0.099 
 -0.101 -0.104 -0.105 -0.105 -0.104 -0.104 
# of past companies founded 0.186** 0.190** 0.163** 0.174** 0.189** 0.185** 
 -0.061 -0.06 -0.062 -0.061 -0.06 -0.06 
Past companies founded: IPOs 0.887*** 0.538** 0.703*** 0.589*** 0.547** 0.581** 
 -0.148 -0.179 -0.169 -0.177 -0.178 -0.177 
Past companies founded: acquisitions 0.995*** 0.907*** 0.899*** 0.916*** 0.914*** 0.918*** 
 -0.077 -0.081 -0.081 -0.082 -0.081 -0.08 
Individual investors: IPOs 0.356+ 0.360+ 0.357** 0.342* 0.364+ 0.371* 
 -0.214 -0.199 -0.118 -0.16 -0.191 -0.174 
Individual investors: acquisitions -0.087 -0.088+ -0.223*** -0.087* -0.089+ -0.095* 
 -0.056 -0.052 -0.064 -0.042 -0.05 -0.046 
# of investments by organizations  0.040*** 0.033*** 0.037*** 0.040*** 0.038*** 
  -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
# of investments received by individuals (angels)   0.164***    
   -0.02    
# of investments by same-gender investors    0.268***   
    -0.035   
# of investments received by individuals with school ties    0.593*  
     -0.23  
# of investments received by co-located individuals      0.435*** 
      -0.072 
       
Observations 49,487 48,939 48,939 48,939 48,939 48,939 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1          
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Table 1.5. Results for Cox proportional hazards event-history models for the hazard of transitioning to angel investing with MSA dummies.  
DV: hazard of entry into angel investing         
VARIABLES Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
          
Gender: female -0.631** -0.572** -0.613** -0.620** 
 -0.214 -0.216 -0.215 -0.215 Founder education: STEM (dummy) -0.436*** -0.443*** -0.449*** -0.448*** 
 -0.103 -0.102 -0.102 -0.102 Founder education: business (dummy) -0.071 -0.098 -0.105 -0.095 
 -0.11 -0.11 -0.109 -0.109 # of past companies founded 0.161* 0.170** 0.183** 0.182** 
 -0.064 -0.065 -0.063 -0.063 Past companies founded: IPOs 0.771*** 0.660*** 0.625*** 0.649*** 
 -0.178 -0.186 -0.188 -0.186 Past companies founded: acquisitions 0.829*** 0.835*** 0.827*** 0.832*** 
 -0.085 -0.086 -0.085 -0.085 Individual investors: IPOs 0.350** 0.330* 0.340+ 0.343* 
 -0.114 -0.152 -0.177 -0.165 Individual investors: acquisitions -0.203*** -0.085* -0.085+ -0.089* 
 -0.06 -0.04 -0.046 -0.043 # of investments by organizations 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 
 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 MSA dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     # of investments received by individuals (angels) 0.149***    
 -0.019    # of investments by same-gender investors  0.236***   
  -0.037   # of investments received by individuals with school ties   0.482*  
   -0.23  # of investments received by co-located individuals    0.362*** 
    -0.077 
     Observations 46,758 46,758 46,758 46,758 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1           
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 Table 1.6. Panel negative binomial results for investments made towards founders of the same gender as the angel investor.  
DV: investments made towards founders of the same gender         
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
          
Past angel investments made -0.111*** -0.114*** -0.115*** -0.112*** 
 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 Gender: female -1.038*** -1.039*** -1.043*** -0.975*** 
 -0.224 -0.224 -0.224 -0.225 Founder education: STEM (dummy) -0.044 -0.048 -0.047 -0.043 
 -0.064 -0.064 -0.064 -0.064 Founder education: business (dummy) 0.056 0.06 0.066 0.075 
 -0.072 -0.072 -0.072 -0.072 # of past companies founded -0.019 -0.021 -0.022 -0.022 
 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 Past companies founded: IPOs 0.035 0.027 0.039 0.05 
 -0.099 -0.099 -0.099 -0.099 Past companies founded: acquisitions 0.129* 0.127* 0.131* 0.128* 
 -0.052 -0.051 -0.052 -0.051 Individual investors: IPOs (orthogonalized) 0.061* 0.058* 0.058* 0.061* 
 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 Individual investors: acquisitions (orthogonalized) 0.023 0.021 0.019 0.018 
 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.029 # of investments by organizations  0.005 0.003 0.003 
  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 # of investments by individuals   0.012  
   -0.01  # of investments received by angels of the same gender (orthog.)    0.089** 
    -0.029 Constant 3.041*** 2.997*** 3.010*** 3.002*** 
 -0.561 -0.553 -0.564 -0.557 
     Observations 3,779 3,779 3,779 3,779 
Number of founders 926 926 926 926 
Standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1       
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Table 1.7. Panel negative binomial results for investments made towards founders having a school tie with the angel investor. 
DV: investments made towards founders with school ties         
 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
          
Past angel investments made -0.158*** -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.156*** 
 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 Gender: female -0.092 -0.088 -0.088 -0.088 
 -0.237 -0.238 -0.238 -0.238 Founder education: STEM (dummy) 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.001 
 -0.092 -0.093 -0.093 -0.093 Founder education: business (dummy) 0.217* 0.215* 0.216* 0.213* 
 -0.103 -0.103 -0.104 -0.103 # of past companies founded -0.03 -0.028 -0.028 -0.027 
 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 Past companies founded: IPOs 0.136 0.148 0.149 0.145 
 -0.138 -0.139 -0.14 -0.139 Past companies founded: acquisitions 0.095 0.096 0.096 0.099 
 -0.076 -0.076 -0.076 -0.076 Individual investors: IPOs (orthogonalized) 0.087* 0.090* 0.090* 0.092* 
 -0.039 -0.039 -0.039 -0.039 Individual investors: acquisitions (orthogonalized) -0.02 -0.018 -0.018 -0.024 
 -0.043 -0.043 -0.043 -0.043 # of investments by organizations  -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
  -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 # of investments by individuals   0  
   -0.014  # of investments received by angels with school ties (orthog.)    -0.064 
    -0.042 Constant 3.171** 3.168** 3.167** 3.192** 
 -1.066 -1.036 -1.035 -1.055 
     Observations 3,779 3,779 3,779 3,779 
Number of id 926 926 926 926 
Standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1       
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Table 1.8. Panel negative binomial results for investments made towards founders located within the same MSA as the angel investor. 
DV: investments made towards co-located founders         
 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 
          
Past angel investments made -0.161*** -0.161*** -0.160*** -0.162*** 
 -0.021 -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 Gender: female 0.011 0.011 0.014 0.015 
 -0.243 -0.243 -0.243 -0.242 Founder education: STEM (dummy) 0.083 0.083 0.082 0.104 
 -0.095 -0.096 -0.096 -0.095 Founder education: business (dummy) -0.005 -0.005 -0.009 0.009 
 -0.109 -0.11 -0.11 -0.109 # of past companies founded -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 
 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 Past companies founded: IPOs -0.151 -0.151 -0.158 -0.143 
 -0.168 -0.168 -0.169 -0.167 Past companies founded: acquisitions 0.036 0.036 0.033 0.057 
 -0.081 -0.081 -0.082 -0.081 Individual investors: IPOs (orthogonalized) 0.042 0.042 0.043 0.031 
 -0.043 -0.044 -0.044 -0.044 Individual investors: acquisitions (orthogonalized) 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.023 
 -0.043 -0.044 -0.044 -0.043 # of investments by organizations  0 0.001 -0.003 
  -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 # of investments by individuals   -0.007  
   -0.015  # of investments received by co-located angels (orthog.)    0.103** 
    -0.038 Constant 3.412+ 3.411+ 3.346* 3.783 
 -1.801 -1.801 -1.682 -2.524 
     Observations 3,779 3,779 3,779 3,779 
Number of founders 926 926 926 926 
Standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1       
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Table 1.9. Panel negative binomial results for investments made under the three homophily conditions, with MSA dummies. 
DV: number of angel investments made School ties Co-location Same gender 
under conditions of homophily Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 
        
Past angel investments made -0.157*** -0.147*** -0.113*** 
 -0.017 -0.022 -0.012 Gender: female -0.189 -0.007 -1.049*** 
 -0.238 -0.232 -0.224 Founder education: STEM (dummy) -0.02 -0.043 -0.052 
 -0.095 -0.094 -0.065 Founder education: business (dummy) 0.283** 0.068 0.109 
 -0.105 -0.106 -0.073 # of past companies founded -0.022 -0.02 -0.016 
 -0.026 -0.027 -0.018 Past companies founded: IPOs 0.169 -0.166 0.045 
 -0.142 -0.166 -0.101 Past companies founded: acquisitions 0.095 -0.019 0.124* 
 -0.076 -0.08 -0.051 Individual investors: IPOs (orthogonalized) 0.094* 0.064 0.065* 
 -0.04 -0.042 -0.028 Individual investors: acquisitions (orthogonalized) -0.018 0.003 0.017 
 -0.043 -0.041 -0.029 # of investments by organizations -0.005 -0.005 0.003 
 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 MSA dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    # of investments received by angels with school ties (orthog.) -0.06   
 -0.042   # of investments received by co-located angels (orthog.)  0.069*  
  -0.034  # of investments received by angels of the same gender (orthog.)   0.080** 
   -0.029 Constant 2.864* 2.751+ 2.839** 
 -1.406 -1.629 -0.941 
    Observations 3,779 3,779 3,779 
Number of founders 926 926 926 
Standard errors in parentheses    *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1     
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CHAPTER II   
What Makes You Fly: Explaining Entrepreneurs’ Success in Angel Investing  (co-authored with Dan J. Wang)  ABSTRACT  Angel investors play a crucial role in entrepreneurial ecosystems, providing entrepreneurs and young ventures not just with capital at an early stage, but also with advice and mentorship. While angel investors hail from different walks of life, most angel investors appear to be current or former entrepreneurs. Prevailing wisdom in the ecosystem holds that entrepreneurs are uniquely positioned to do well as investors, in that they possess tacit knowledge not just about their industry, but about the working mechanisms of venture financing, as well. In this paper, we thus examine the question of what drives entrepreneurs’ success in angel investing. We do so by leveraging a sample of U.S. angel investors with entrepreneurial experience drawn from CrunchBase and linking their investment performance to their track record as entrepreneurs. We show that while investing across market categories is associated with a higher number of successful exits in general, angel investors with broad entrepreneurial experience are found to do especially well. Success is also a function of effective knowledge translation: on average, successful entrepreneurs tend to become more successful angels, but we find this effect to be stronger the greater the overlap between the entrepreneurial experience of the founder and their angel investment portfolio. We discuss the implications of our findings for research on entrepreneurial ecosystems.   
 
This research was funded in part by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation. The contents of this publication are solely the responsibility of the authors. 
 
 Keywords:  angel investing; performance; 
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In the past few decades, entrepreneurship research has increasingly recognized that individuals 
within entrepreneurial ecosystem move from position to position, and from role to role, in a rather 
fluid fashion (Burton et al., 2016; Dobrev & Barnett, 2005; Rider, Thompson, Kacperczyk, & Tåg, 
2016). Indeed, not only do entrepreneurs often come from the private sector, often returning to it 
as employees at a later date; rather, individuals often move between being employees, founders, 
board members, and investors, often taking up multiple roles at once. Such role transitions, 
however, typically require a reconfiguration of knowledge (Powell & Snellman, 2004), which 
comes with a redeployment of skills and talents. In the process, lessons learned through past 
experiences are transformed and adapted to new tasks, which likely poses different challenges to 
individuals with different professional profiles. Specialists with a narrow skillset might find 
adaptation to new roles more difficult, while those with a broader, less focused profile might find 
it easier. But how do individuals build on their experiences in previous roles as they take up new 
ones? And is having a focused profile (e.g. Ferguson & Hasan, 2013; Leung, 2014; Merluzzi & 
Phillips, 2015) detrimental or helpful to individuals looking to progress in their careers? 
Overall, the existing literature does not yet offer a comprehensive account of how success 
in one role might correlate to later success in other roles. Much in the same fashion, we also know 
little about whether and how specialization, vis-à-vis maintaining a generalist profile, might help 
or hinder career outcomes as individuals move from one career step to the next and transition 
across different roles. These issues are especially germane in the case of entrepreneurship 
ecosystems, given that in them: 1) individuals often occupy multiple different roles over the course 
of their careers, such as entrepreneur, employee and investor; and 2) generalist profiles often 
coexist with highly specialized profiles. We argue, therefore, that a deeper understanding of such 
issues is very much desirable, and this will serve as the driving force behind our work. 
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In this paper, we thus bridge existing accounts of careers, learning, and knowledge 
translation in market settings to examine entrepreneurial career dynamics (Burton et al., 2016)—
that is, how individuals transition into, out of, and across roles in the entrepreneurial ecosystem. 
Extant studies in this area have predominantly focused on entrepreneurial entry from the 
workforce, as well as on the transition from the workforce to entrepreneurship (Rider et al., 2016; 
Sørensen & Sharkey, 2014) and from venture capital to entrepreneurship (Kacperczyk, 2013). 
Here, however, our focus is on the transition between entrepreneurship and angel investing, 
which—while highly prevalent—has been largely overlooked in extant research (although see 
Cumming et al., 2016 for a notable exception). In so doing, we examine the correlates of successful 
angel investing outcomes, with an eye to the extent to which successful entrepreneurs-turned-
angels leverage their past experience as founders, and whether specialization in either domain is 
beneficial. In other words, is entrepreneurial experience predictive of success in angel investing? 
Does specialization as entrepreneurs improve or diminish angel investing performance? At a 
baseline level, our findings suggest that entrepreneurs-turned-angels whose investing portfolio 
span market categories tend to do better on average. We argue, however, that the extent of this 
effect is contingent on the individual’s breadth of entrepreneurial experience, inasmuch as those 
angels who founded companies spanning market categories should reap greater benefits from 
having a diversified investment portfolio. This is because such angels should be better able to 
translate their lived experiences as boundary-spanning entrepreneurs into actionable knowledge 
that will allow them to more effectively invest across market categories. We also argue that 
successful entrepreneurs should—ceteris paribus—also be more successful angel investors, but 
that this effect is contingent on the degree of overlap between their entrepreneurial experience and 
their portfolio choices as investors. 
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In what follows, we briefly outline our empirical setting—angel investing—and its role 
and function in the entrepreneurial ecosystem, as well as its importance for the financing of new 
ventures. Then, we lay out our theoretical framework and we develop formal hypotheses to be 
tested concerning the impact of entrepreneurial experience and specialization on angel investing 
outcomes. We continue by presenting our data, methods, and results, and we conclude by 
elaborating their implications for the scholarly understanding of the entrepreneurial ecosystem, as 
well as for the literatures on careers, learning, and specialist/generalist dynamics in management 
and organizational studies.  
 
ANGEL INVESTING IN THE ENTREPRENEURIAL ECOSYSTEM  
Within the entrepreneurship literature, venture financing represents one of the most extensively 
investigated topics (Shane & Cable, 2002; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001, 2008b), inasmuch as the first 
milestone for any successful venture consists of securing an adequate supply of capital. Therefore, 
the capital allocation mechanisms through which ventures are funded is of interest not only to 
entrepreneurship researchers, but also to economic sociologists (Podolny, 2001) and finance 
scholars (Hsu, 2004). Most of the existing studies of venture financing have predominantly focused 
on venture capital (VC)—that is, private equity funds that specialize in financing small, emerging 
firms with high growth potential. This literature has yielded numerous useful insights on the 
structure of venture financing networks, on syndication patterns among venture capital firms, and 
on the effects that such dynamics may exert on the founding, growth and success of new ventures, 
as well as on regional dynamics such as the formation of clusters (see for instance Hochberg, 
Lindsey, & Westerfield, 2015; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007; Kogut, Urso, & Walker, 2007; 
Sorenson & Stuart, 2001, 2008b). 
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Venture capital, however, is only one of the manifold ways in which entrepreneurial 
ventures can obtain financing (Shane, 2008). In particular, while venture capitalists typically 
provide the lion’s share of the funding for many successful ventures, angel investors fulfill an 
equally critical, although underappreciated, role. According to Shane (2008: 14), “an angel 
investor is a person who provides capital, in the form of debt or equity, from his own funds to a 
private business owned and operated by someone else, who is neither a friend nor a family 
member.” In this regard, angel investors differ from venture capitalists, who typically do not invest 
their own money, and from friends-and-family investors, who provide capital to business run by 
family or other acquaintances. Angel investing has grown in both visibility and importance in the 
past decade, both in the United States and in other nations, developed and developing alike (Kerr 
et al., 2014), partly thanks to popular TV shows such as Shark Tank, Money Tigers and Dragons’ 
Den. While the size of the angel market is difficult to estimate due to the lack of official figures, 
in the United States it was believed to be as big as the venture capital market in 2004: indeed, 
based on official figures business angels invested $23 billion in young companies, while venture 
capitalists invested about $20 billion. In 2014, after the global financial crisis, the total U.S. angel 
market was estimated to be worth $24.1 billion. In the past few years, angel investing has shown 
strong growth trends all over the world, with the European angel market doubling in size and the 
Canadian one tripling. Moreover, interestingly enough, in the United States, a majority of angel 
investors are current or former entrepreneurs (Shane, 2008); while some angels have backgrounds 
in consulting, investment banking or large firms more generally, entrepreneurship is by far the 
most common career path leading to angel investing. 
Beyond market size figures, however, angel investors are arguably also important because 
of the role they have come to play in the entrepreneurial ecosystem. Because most angels invest 
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relatively early, at the seed stage, angels are often the very first filter entrepreneurs encounter as 
they attempt to develop their ideas into successful ventures. Typically, angels come in after 
entrepreneurs have secured funding from friends and family and have tapped into personal funds, 
but before venture capital funds get on board. Although the size of the average angel investment 
is modest, with $25,000 being a fairly typical figure, securing angel funding is increasingly seen 
as a crucial step insofar as the involvement of angel investors, especially prominent ones, is seen 
as a positive signal (Spence, 1974) by venture capitalists, who tend to look at angel-backed 
ventures more favorably. Kerr et al., (2014) also found that angel-backed ventures tend to do better 
than comparable ventures which are not angel-backed, not just because of the angels’ venture 
picking skills and the signaling dynamics described above, but also because angels often provide 
guidance and mentorship to founders, which can make a difference in the long run.  
Additionally, angel investors are—or should be—of particular interest to scholars of 
organizations and markets because they often make investment decisions based on “gut feeling” 
(Huang & Pearce, 2015), since they invest at the early stage when the value of an entrepreneurial 
idea or the founding team is still largely unknown. Because little information is available, angel 
investors then rely on their social connections to reduce uncertainty, which makes them 
particularly prone to being influenced by social considerations. While this line of argument applies 
to venture capital as well, to a degree (e.g. Podolny, 2001; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001), the structured, 
informal nature of angel investing and its reliance on social interaction make it uniquely suitable 
for analysis through the theoretical lens of economic sociology.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
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In what follows, we articulate our arguments about the potential antecedents of success in angel 
investing. We integrate various strands of the organizational literature with the goal of providing 
a comprehensive framework of how entrepreneurs-turned-angels rely on their background as 
founders to develop portfolio strategies. Our starting point here is that, across organizational 
domains, the specialist-generalist dilemma represents one of the most intriguing puzzles of the 
management and entrepreneurship literature. In existing studies on labor markets and careers, 
scholars have long maintained that specialization is typically advantageous (Ferguson & Hasan, 
2013), in that it allows for an easier assessment of fit by employers, which makes the hiring process 
smoother. A complementary, skill-based argument advanced by economists (e.g. Becker & 
Murphy, 1992: 1137) suggests that specialization is beneficial “because returns to the time spent 
on tasks are usually greater to workers who concentrate on a narrower range of skills”. This line 
of argument also resonates with Durkheim (1997 [1893]) and Smith (1904), both of whom 
remarked that the division of labor positively correlates with societal advancement, because it 
increases as a society progresses and brings about increases in productivity. 
Conversely, other scholarly accounts posit that be a generalist might be just as—if not 
more—advantageous under certain circumstances. For instance Smith (1904), while identifying 
specialization as a hallmark of societal progress, was perhaps also the first to note that: 
 
 …the man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the effects are perhaps always 
the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanding or to exercise his invention in finding 
out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, 
and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become. 
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Later scholars have noted that generalists might be especially prized in settings where a diversity 
of experiences and skills is valued (Custódio, Ferreira, & Matos, 2013). In this regard, and with 
specific reference to entrepreneurship, Lazear (2004, 2005) has advanced a (now dominant) theory 
of the entrepreneur as jack-of-all-trades, whereby individuals with a balanced skillset are more 
likely to become entrepreneurs and to succeed at founding new ventures. Conversely, individuals 
with specialized skill profiles are posited to do better in the labor market (see also Åstebro & 
Thompson, 2011). 
Given the totality of the arguments presented above, in the context of angel investing 
outcomes we would expect generalists to do better than specialists for two reasons: 1) not unlike 
entrepreneurs, angel investors must also build on a diverse skillset and on a breadth of diverse 
knowledge to be successful, which makes Lazear’s theory comparatively more applicable than 
specialization- or fit-based arguments. If this is the case, then investing across market categories 
should be associated with better angel investment outcomes. More formally, then:  
 
Hypothesis 1. Market breadth, defined as investing across multiple market categories, will be 
associated with better angel investing outcomes.  
  
Having established this baseline prediction, we now turn to the broad question of how angel 
investors can leverage their entrepreneurial experience, and of whether the characteristics of their 
entrepreneurial background might have a bearing on their investing outcomes. In organizational 
studies and entrepreneurship alike, a substantial theoretical tradition has maintained that experts 
tend to make better evaluators than non-experts, effectively acting as gatekeepers to key resources 
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and shaping demand (Gans, 2008; Reinstein & Snyder, 2005).20 The entrepreneurial ecosystem is 
certainly no exception (Ferrary & Granovetter, 2009), insofar as venture capitalists and angels are 
recognized as experts and their judgment effectively shapes the supply of capital that new ventures 
receive. A question that has never been explicitly investigated in the literature, however, is whether 
expertise accumulated as an entrepreneur might help an investor make better decisions. The 
question is made even more relevant, we argue, by the fact that in entrepreneurial ecosystem, 
founders are routinely believed to make better angel investors, regardless of their actual track 
record. 
Here, we thus argue that whether angel investors are able to tap into their own 
entrepreneurial background to make better investing decisions will be a function of whether they 
are able to successfully translate knowledge across domains—in this specific case, through 
different roles in the entrepreneurial ecosystem (Bidwell & Briscoe, 2010; O’Mahony & Bechky, 
2006). In this regard, research on learning in psychology (Ellis, 1965; Estes, 1970) suggests that 
individuals’ abilities are crucially shaped by their past experiences and, more specifically, that 
their ability to incorporate new experiences and encode them into useful knowledge hinges on the 
breadth and variety of their background. The recognition and assimilation of new information, 
therefore, is a function of the individual’s prior knowledge (e.g. Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
In the specific case of entrepreneurs-turned-angels, we therefore argue that a more diverse 
entrepreneurial background should be predictive of better angel investing outcomes when 
investing spans market categories, since the breadth of experiences should translate into the 
development of flexible, boundary-spanning knowledge (Carlile, 2002, 2004) which, in turn, will 
help in the formulation of superior investment strategies across industries. More formally:  
                                                          20 See also Budescu & Chen, 2015; Greenstein & Zhu, 2018; Mollick & Nanda, 2016. 
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Hypothesis 2. The effect of market breadth on angel investing outcomes will be especially strong 
for those angel investors with broad entrepreneurial experience—defined as having founded 
companies that span a greater number of market categories.   
 
Another recurring theme in the vast literature on learning concerns the extent to which social actors 
are able to learn from success and failure, both at the individual (Deichmann & Ende, 2014; Ellis 
& Davidi, 2005; Ellis, Mendel, & Nir, 2006) and at the organizational level (Baum & Dahlin, 
2007; Madsen & Desai, 2010; Muehlfeld, Sahib, & van Witteloostuijn, 2012). While the scholarly 
consensus maintains that success and failure translate into qualitatively different types of learning, 
the literature has also emphasized the powerful role of success in shaping learning outcomes and, 
by extension, catalyzing the accumulation and the encoding of knowledge.  
For instance, in the context of idea generation, Deichmann & Ende (2014) show that when 
success is a rare event, it stands out and therefore presents individuals with a much more salient 
learning opportunity. As a result, the prior experience of success is a stronger correlate of positive 
outcomes than experiences of failure. Because the entrepreneurial ecosystem is another example 
of a setting where success is exceedingly rare, it is little wonder that the literature in 
entrepreneurship has offered similar findings. For instance, Parker (2013) has shown that serial 
entrepreneurs tend to develop more successful ventures over time, generating a success-breeds-
success dynamic (see also Gompers et al., 2010). Insofar as it is an extremely rare event, success 
also offers founders unique opportunities for learning, which can then be leveraged in future 
endeavors, entrepreneurial or otherwise (March et al., 1991). 
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While the above findings pertain to serial entrepreneurship—that is, to entrepreneurs 
founding several ventures—from the extant literature, it is less clear whether successful 
experiences have an impact beyond the current role occupied by the individual. Does venture 
success help individuals who transition from entrepreneurship to the provision of capital, for 
instance by becoming venture capitalists or angel investors? This question ultimately rests on the 
portability of knowledge (Groysberg, Lee, & Nanda, 2008) across different roles in the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. For angel investors, success crucially hinges on early-stage 
identification of companies that will grow to be successful, and that will therefore either be 
acquired or go public, ideally within a decade. And a successful entrepreneur is likely better able 
to identify such companies based on his or her own personal experience, having accumulated tacit 
knowledge not only about the dynamics of a specific industry but, most importantly, about how 
ventures are run and financed, about what it takes to build a successful founding team, and about 
how ventures should be scaled to achieve profitability and growth. All of the above types of 
knowledge are arguably quite helpful to angel investors, as well. For what pertains to our study, it 
is therefore reasonable to expect that, other things being equal, successful entrepreneurs will be 
more likely to also succeed at angel investing, insofar as learning from successful experiences will 
result in superior outcomes as individuals move from entrepreneurship to angel investing and 
become suppliers of capital. Then:  
 
Hypothesis 3. Entrepreneurial success—defined as having founded companies that were acquired 
or had an IPO—is associated with better angel investing outcomes.  
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Finally, we investigate the boundary conditions of the above hypothesis, looking into whether 
entrepreneurial success is more predictive of success in angel investing in certain conditions. In 
this regard, insofar as success in angel investing rests on successful knowledge translation of the 
“lessons learned” during one’s entrepreneurial career, the effect of entrepreneurial success should 
be moderated by the similarity between an individual’s investing activities and their founding 
experiences. Indeed, when successful entrepreneurs become angels and invest in the same 
industries in which they founded their own ventures, their experience should be immediately 
relevant to the task at hand and therefore easier to encode into useful knowledge, which should 
allow for a more successful portfolio selection. If this is the case, then entrepreneurial success 
should show a stronger association with angel investing outcomes under conditions of greater 
overlap between an individual’s portfolio companies and their experience as founders. Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 4. The effect of entrepreneurial success on angel investing outcomes will be especially 
strong for those angel investors with greater overlap between entrepreneurial and investing 
experience—defined as the number of categories in common between founded companies and 
investment targets.   
DATA AND METHODS  
Our study’s main data source, Crunchbase, is a crowdsourced yet curated online database of the 
startup ecosystem launched in 2007 as an offshoot of TechCrunch, a preeminent online news 
source for entrepreneurship-related information in the United States. Crunchbase relies primarily 
on crowdsourcing for contributions, meaning that verified users can input information; however, 
to ensure data quality and accuracy, such contributions are then typically verified and triangulated 
with other comparable databases (such as AngelList) as well as with commercial data sources (like 
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VentureSource and VentureXpert) by Crunchbase staff. Because Crunchbase provides limited 
information about individual founders and investors, however, we also use other sources—
primarily LinkedIn and U.S. Census data—to assign individuals to a geographical area, 
operationalized as the relevant Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). 
 Dependent variable. Because we focus on success in angel investing as our dependent 
variable, and because success in angel investing is conventionally measured as the number of 
successful exits—that is, either acquisitions or initial public offerings (IPOs)—within an angel 
investor’s portfolio, we measure success as the logged count of successful exits, where a successful 
exit is defined to occur when a company in an angel investor’s portfolio gets acquired or goes 
public. While IPOs typically tend to result in a much higher payoff than acquisitions, Crunchbase 
typically does not include information about the dollar value of deals, so we are unable to 
incorporate this information into our analysis. In our view, however, it makes sense to consider 
acquisitions and IPOs together in this setting, insofar as: 1) successful exits constitute a very small 
portion of the typical investor’s portfolio, and therefore they are both seen as extremely positive 
outcomes; 2) IPOs are exceedingly rare events in the angel investing world, and thus it makes little 
sense to consider them separately.  
Independent variables. For Hypothesis 1, the relevant independent variable is portfolio 
breadth, operationalized as the number of Crunchbase categories represented in the focal angel 
investor’s current portfolio.21 Because every company in Crunchbase is assigned one or more 
categories, we construct this variable by simply adding up the number of unique categories for all 
companies in the focal angel investor’s portfolio at time t. In a similar fashion, for Hypothesis 2 
                                                          21 Crunchbase provides a two-level categorization system, with categories and higher-order category groups. Here we use category groups because Crunchbase includes over 700 categories, and therefore using these would make comparison across firms doing very similar things extremely difficult. 
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the breadth of entrepreneurial experience is defined as the number of unique categories assigned 
to all companies founded by the angel investor up to time t. As far as Hypothesis 3 is concerned, 
and consistent with our dependent variable, we operationalize entrepreneurial success as the 
number of successful exits recorded for companies founded by the focal entrepreneur-turned-
angel. Finally, for Hypothesis 4 the degree of overlap between founding and portfolio categories 
is operationalized as: 
ܦܱܱ = |ܲ ∩ ܨ||ܲ ∪ ܨ| 
where P are the unique categories in the angel investor’s portfolio at time t and F are the unique 
categories spanned by the companies founded by the same individual up to time t. This variable 
varies between 0, in the case in which the individuals’ angel investing activity is completely 
unrelated to their founding experience, and 1 in the case in which there is complete overlap.  
Control variables. To help rule out potentially confounding alternative explanations, we 
add a battery of control variables to our models. Consistent with prior literature, we control for the 
gender of the entrepreneur-angel, because of the substantial barriers faced by women and the 
differential treatment they typically receive in the ecosystem (e.g. Brooks, Huang, Kearney, & 
Murray, 2014; Kanze, Conley, Huang, & Higgins, 2017), which might result in different outcomes. 
Because more experienced angel investors might be more skilled at picking successful ventures, 
we also control for angel investor tenure—that is, the number of years from the first angel 
investment made by the individual—as well as for the number of past angel investments made. 
Because the more prolific serial entrepreneurs might also be better angel investors, we also control 
for the number of companies founded by the individual. Finally, to rule out unobserved 
heterogeneity at the geographic level, as well as time effects, our models also include year 
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dummies and Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) dummies. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics 
for all of our variables, as well as a correlation table. 
 
-------------- Insert Table 2.1 about here -------------- 
 
RESULTS  
-------------- Insert Table 2.2 about here -------------- 
 
Table 2 reports the results of the panel OLS models we used to test our hypotheses. Model 1 
includes just the basic control variables, while Model 2 adds dummies for the Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA) where the angel investor is based, as well as year dummies. Model 3 then 
adds market breadth, i.e. the number of categories spanned by the investment portfolio of the focal 
angel investor in year t. Its coefficient is positive and significant, as predicted, which is consistent 
with Hypothesis 1 and reflective of the idea that diversification across sectors tends to yield better 
angel investing outcomes. Model 4 then adds the interaction between market breadth and the 
breadth of entrepreneurial experience—that is, the number of categories spanned by the companies 
founded by the entrepreneur-turned-investor up to time t.  In line with Hypothesis 2, the coefficient 
for this interaction term is also positive and significant, corroborating our assertion that angel 
investors who span market categories in their portfolio do especially well when they also have 
broad experience as entrepreneurs, insofar as entrepreneurial breadth allows for the more flexible 
translation of knowledge across domains, resulting in better angel investing outcomes when an 
investor’s portfolio also spans market boundaries.  
   
58  
Model 5 includes two additional variables: the number of successful exits for companies 
founded by the focal entrepreneur-angel, whose positive and significant coefficient indicates that 
more successful entrepreneurs do better at angel investing, and the overlap between the portfolio 
categories and the founding categories, in line with Hypothesis 3. This coefficient is negative and 
significant, which is suggestive of the fact that a greater overlap between investing portfolio and 
entrepreneurial experience in terms of market categories actually worsens investment 
performance. While this result might appear counterintuitive, it is actually in alignment with the 
idea that angel investors who rely predominantly on their past experience as entrepreneurs—which 
is typically limited—in their investment choices tend to do comparatively worse than category-
spanners, in that the latter are able to diversify their portfolio in a more effective manner. Model 6 
then interacts these two latter variables to show that the extent to which entrepreneurs are learning 
from success is, however, a function of overlap between their investment choices and their 
entrepreneurial choices; in other words, entrepreneurial success translates to angel investing 
success to a greater degree when the overlap between entrepreneurial and investing choices is 
greater, which provides support for Hypothesis 4. 
DISCUSSION  
In this paper, we have examined the antecedents of successful outcomes in angel investing, which, 
among all roles individuals can play in the entrepreneurial ecosystem, is perhaps the one having 
received the least amount of scholarly attention to date. In so doing, we posited that successful 
angel investing outcomes would be (at least in part) explained by the extent and characteristics of 
one’s experience as founder, as well by having a generalist (vis-à-vis specialist) profile. In this 
regard our main findings are: 1) that angel investing across industries correlates with superior 
outcomes, and therefore “generalist” angel investors tend to do comparatively better; 2) that angel 
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investors with broad entrepreneurial experience are found to do even better upon investing across 
market categories; 3) that successful entrepreneurs tend to do better at angel investing; and 4) that 
the extent to which angels are able to translate their entrepreneurial success into knowledge useful 
to their angel investing activities is a function of the overlap between their portfolio and their 
experience as founders.  
Overall, beyond contributing to the scholarly understanding of career dynamics in the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem, it is our contention that our work also has broader implications for 
several strands of the literature on organizations and labor markets. First of all, our results extend, 
and build on, Lazear's (2005) conceptualization of the entrepreneur as jack-of-all-trades, showing 
that a broad, generalist profile is beneficial even as entrepreneurs transition to angel investing 
because breadth and diversity of experiences help individuals translate their knowledge in a more 
flexible manner in this setting, as well. Second, our work integrates existing accounts of learning 
in market settings by empirically investigating the extent to which learning from experiences, 
especially successful ones, is influenced by the specialization of an individual’s skillset, as well as 
by the degree of matching between current tasks and past experiences. And finally, our paper also 
contributes to the burgeoning literature on role transitions in entrepreneurial ecosystem (Burton et 
al., 2016; Rider et al., 2016; Sørensen & Sharkey, 2014) by examining the career trajectories of 
entrepreneurs-turned-angels, which account for a majority of the informal supply of venture 
financing in the U.S. today. In pursuing this line of inquiry, our hope is to draw greater scholarly 
attention to issues concerning transitions among different roles in the ecosystem, as well as to the 
challenges that such transitions entail in terms of knowledge translation and skill adaptation, as 
well as to the contingent benefits of specialization in such circumstances.
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Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics and correlation table.  
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Table 2.2. Panel OLS models for the number of successful exits in the focal angel investors portfolio.   
 
   DV: logged cumulative count of successful exits for the focal angel investor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
              
       
Gender: female 0.005 -0.004 0.012 0.006 0.010 0.009 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) Angel investor tenure 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) Number of past angel investments made 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) Number of founded companies 0.014* 0.016** 0.014** 0.011* 0.007 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Number of categories in founded companies 0.003 0.001 -0.005 -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.017*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) Number of categories in investment portfolio   0.023*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) Categories in founded companies X Categories in investment portfolio    0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Successful exits of founded companies     0.016*** 0.004 
     (0.005) (0.007) 
Overlap between investor portfolio and founded company categories     
-0.052*** -0.077*** 
     (0.013) (0.014) Successful exits X Overlap      0.034** 
      (0.012) MSA dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant -0.079*** -0.129 -0.159+ -0.104 -0.075 -0.066 
 (0.014) (0.136) (0.084) (0.096) (0.088) (0.084) 
       Observations 11,132 10,713 10,713 10,713 10,713 10,713 
Number of angels in the sample 2,596 2,501 2,501 2,501 2,501 2,501 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1       
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CHAPTER III   
Community Social Capital and the Financing of New Ventures: Evidence from Angel Investing, 2005-2015   ABSTRACT  A growing body of literature in entrepreneurship has come to recognize that entrepreneurial ecosystem dynamics are a function, at least in part, of the characteristics the social milieu in which they are embedded. Venture financing, in particular, can be seen a social process, insofar as it requires the development of relationships between one of more investors and the founding team. Here, I advance the argument that social capital at the community level has a bearing on individual decision concerning entry into venture financing, as well as capital allocation choices. This is because both the decision to become an entrepreneur and the eventual, subsequent transition to angel investing are inherently social, and are therefore especially likely to occur in communities that are characterized by greater social connectedness. Furthermore, areas with more well-developed opportunity structures for socialization should also be especially conducive to the development of local financing relationships. In this study, I thus examine the role of community social capital in angel investing across Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the United States between 2005 and 2015, building on data from CrunchBase and several U.S. Census datasets. In so doing, I show that: 1) MSAs with greater social capital exhibit a higher density of VC-funded entrepreneurs; 2) in such MSAs, a greater proportion of this population of entrepreneurs will become angel investors; and 3) such areas are also characterized by a comparatively higher proportion of angel investments targeting companies within the same MSA. I then discuss the implications of my findings for the literature on community social capital in sociology, as well as for the broader scholarly understanding of entrepreneurial ecosystems.    
 
 
This research was funded in part by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation. The contents of this publication are solely the responsibility of the author. 
 Keywords:  angel investing; social capital; community    
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 “Not only is investing locally more convenient, but it is also a way for me to give back and contribute to the New 
York ecosystem, which has given me so much.” 22  One of the centerpieces of the economic sociology literature in the past few decades has been the 
notion of embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi & Lancaster, 2004): that is, the idea that patterns 
of economic exchange are inextricably “embedded” into the social milieu within which they take 
place. Only recently, however, have entrepreneurship scholars begun to fully grasp the importance 
of studying the linkages between community-level features and the emergence and growth of new 
ventures (Dahl & Sorenson, 2010, 2012). This is not to say that location has not featured 
prominently in extant research on entrepreneurship and venture financing (Saxenian, 1994). 
Existing research, however, has focused on agglomeration (e.g. Sorenson & Audia, 2000) as a 
source of economies of scale and knowledge diffusion, such as in the case of the Silicon Valley, 
or of Italy’s industrial districts. What remains unclear, however, is whether location matters merely 
because of its economic climate and the presence of other firms, or there is more to the picture. In 
this regard, economic geographers have long held that entrepreneurship is also a function of a 
region’s culture, as expressed through its values and its  (e.g. Aoyama, 2009; Gertler, 2004). Yet 
even this explanation is likely incomplete, insofar as empirical studies have failed to identify a 
strong link between culture and ecosystem-level patterns (Lee, Florida, & Acs, 2004; Sorenson, 
2017). 
 To address this “undersocialized” view of entrepreneurial ecosystem, recent studies have 
begun advancing a more explicit connection between entrepreneurial ecosystems and the patterns 
of social relationships within the communities in which they are embedded. For instance, Kwon, 
Heflin, & Ruef (2013) explore the extent to which community social capital affects 
entrepreneurship, measured as self-employment, while Samila & Sorenson (2017) found that 
                                                          22 Excerpt from an interview with a NYC-based angel investor conducted in the Spring of 2017. 
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venture capital has a more pronounced effect on entrepreneurial growth in communities 
characterized by greater connectedness and integration. These recent developments, however, have 
largely overlooked how community characteristics influence the emergence and evolution of 
venture financing processes. This is an important omission, because whether entrepreneurial 
ecosystems grow and thrive does not uniquely rest on entrepreneurship as a creating force. Venture 
financing is equally necessary, but the literature offer little insight concerning what might drive 
individuals and organizations to become suppliers of capital. In other words, for a thriving 
ecosystem to develop, founding and funding dynamics are equally important, yet existing work 
has predominantly focused of the former, at the detriment of the latter. In this study, therefore, my 
goal is to shed light on these dynamics by exploring how variations in social capital at the 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level and over time affect the local prevalence of 
entrepreneurs, angel investors, as well as angel financing patterns.  
In the remainder of this paper, then, I first discuss the empirical setting for this study—
angel investing in the United States—with a view to briefly explaining what it is, how it differs 
from venture capital, as well as who angel investors are and where they come from. Then, after 
briefly reviewing the literature on social capital as it pertains to entrepreneurship and venture 
financing, I build a theoretical framework that links social capital with: a) the number of 
entrepreneurs at the community-level; b) the number of entrepreneurs that will become angel 
investors; and c) the extent to which the angel investments made by angels within the community 
will remain within the community, by financing local ventures. I continue by discussing my data, 
variables, and methods. After presenting my results, in the concluding section I elaborate on the 




ANGEL INVESTING IN THE UNITED STATES  
While venture financing has received substantial attention in the scholarly literature on 
entrepreneurship, most of the studies that have done so have focused on venture capital (e.g. 
Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). This is likely a function of both the relative prominence of venture 
capital, relative to angel investing, in terms of the amount of capital provided to ventures—typical 
angel investments tend to be between $20,000 and $50,000, while a round of venture capital often 
exceeds $1 million—and the relative availability of data: while commercial databases for the study 
of venture capital investment patterns have long been available, such as VentureSource and 
VentureXpert—historically most empirical studies of angel investing relied on surveys and 
relatively small samples. Yet this research trend runs counter to the increased importance and 
visibility of angel investing in the past couple decades, both in the United States and globally 
(Lerner et al., 2016). In the past few years, the angel investing market has also shown strong growth 
trends all over the world. 
Unlike venture capitalists, who are typically managers who operate a fund specialized in 
new ventures,  angel investors are individuals who provide “capital, in the form of debt or equity, 
from their own funds to a private business owned and operated by someone else, who is neither a 
friend nor a family member” (Shane, 2008: 14). Unlike venture capitalists, therefore, angel 
investors tap into their personal funds, which often translates into a stronger degree of personal 
involvement in the portfolio of ventures the angel chooses to finance. While a majority of angel 
investors tend to be clustered in the three largest U.S. ecosystems—New York, the Silicon Valley, 
and Boston—many, if not most, U.S. communities appear to have an active angel investing scene, 
including relatively remote areas of the country, like Hawai’i. Furthermore, while a good number 
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of angels have backgrounds in the corporate sector—such as banking, finance, or management 
consulting—in the U.S. a majority of angel investors are current or former entrepreneurs.   
 The above discussion raises a number of related questions that should be of interest to 
scholars and practitioners alike: why do angel investors decide to provide funding to entrepreneurs 
and their nascent ventures? And why do so many entrepreneurs choose this path? While collecting 
my dissertation data I had the opportunity to speak with a variety of angel investors, and therefore 
I also had a chance to inquire about their motivations. A good starting point here, however, is the 
conventional wisdom suggesting that the economic motive is the dominant force; that is, most 
angel investors decide to fund nascent ventures primarily to make money. This is consistent with 
the limited empirical evidence available: for instance, a survey of 230 business angels in Germany 
(Stedler & Peters, 2003) finds support for the idea that the desire to earn money and achieve 
superior returns is a significant motivator for angels, insofar as it is generally listed among the top 
four reasons for investing.  
This basic intuition, however, runs counter to what are known to be the overall returns for 
the U.S. population of angel investors (Mason & Harrison, 2002). Among suppliers of capital, the 
fact that angel investors on average do not make much money and that the returns to angel 
investing tend to be lower than those of venture capital are common knowledge: this is both 
because the returns to venture capital have not been stellar in the past two decades (Mulcahy, 
Weeks, & Bradley, 2012) and because angels tend to invest  much earlier than VCs do, which 
often results in higher risk and less compelling opportunities being available.23 For instance, in a 
study of financial returns of angels who invest in groups, Wiltbank & Boeker (2007) found that 52 
percent of investments lose money (i.e. produces a return of less than 1X); on the other hand, 61 
                                                          23 See for example: https://techcrunch.com/2012/09/30/why-angel-investors-dont-make-money-and-advice-for-people-who-are-going-to-become-angels-anyway/  
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percent of investors sampled had an overall portfolio return greater than 1X. Similar patterns were 
observed by Wiltbank & Brooks (2016), which in a later study of angel returns found that: 1) the 
median angel investment is a loss; 2) the earning distribution is highly skewed, so that 10 percent 
of exits generate 85 percent of all returns; and 3) 70 percent of all investments lose money. All of 
the above is not to say that angel investing does not make money in the absolute: Wiltbank & 
Brooks' (2016) data suggests that the internal rate of return for angel investment portfolios is 22 
percent. However, earnings are likely to be unevenly distributed across the population, with the 
greatest returns accruing to a fairly small subset of wealthy, well-connected, and powerful 
investors. This leaves open the question of what might lead the remaining angel investors to choose 
finance new ventures, insofar as they are statistically unlikely to achieve substantial returns, 
especially in light of the available alternatives, such as the stock market or real estate.  
To partly address this question, in the first chapter of this dissertation I sketched a 
sociological explanation of entry by entrepreneurs into angel investing; in so doing, I suggested 
that generalized reciprocity and homophily play a role, in that entrepreneurs who are financed by 
angels are especially likely to become angels in turn, and even more so when they are similar to 
the financing angel across one or more dimensions. Further, I argued that these mechanisms’ 
influence extends to the entrepreneurs-turned-angel’s investing choices and push them to invest in 
other entrepreneurs who are also like them. In the remainder of the paper, I extend this line of 
inquiry by presenting a similar, and in many ways complementary, argument: that the level of 
social connectedness within a community—traditionally labeled “social capital”—has a bearing 
not just on entrepreneurial entry (Kwon et al., 2013), but also on venture financing choices, and 




THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Social capital in the literature: organizational studies vs. sociology. Over the past few 
decades, the construct of social capital has been the subject of a burgeoning amount of research 
efforts, both in management (e.g. Adler & Kwon, 2002; Kwon & Adler, 2014) and in sociology 
(e.g. Portes, 1998; Portes & Vickstrom, 2011). As far as the former strand of the literature is 
concerned, business scholars have predominantly focused on social capital as a strategic resource 
that individuals and organizations can exploit in market settings, with the core intuition being that 
the focal actor’s relations—whether based in economic exchange, hierarchy, or pure socialization 
(Adler & Kwon, 2002)—can be leveraged to produce positive outcomes of various kinds. In the 
extant literature, these have included—but are not limited to—career outcomes (Burt, 1992), hiring 
(Fernandez, Castilla, & Moore, 2000), job search (Granovetter, 1973), knowledge transmission 
(Hansen, 1999), learning (Kraatz, 1998), and value creation (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). Overall, this 
literature has emphasized the role of social capital as a strategic resource: that is, as a set of 
relational assets that can be leveraged in the pursuit of specific opportunities and goals. This 
general orientation is reflected in, and extends to, studies of entrepreneurship carried out by 
management scholars: existing work has examined the role of relationships, such as the founding 
team’s social ties, in shaping new venture outcomes (Shane & Cable, 2002); it has also analyzed 
connections as opportunities for opportunity identification and resource mobilization (Stuart & 
Sorenson, 2003) and their role in the emergence of interfirm collaboration (Walker, Kogut, & 
Shan, 1997). 
While in organization and management studies social capital has typically been explored 
at the level of the focal social actor, research on social capital in sociology is largely characterized 
by a community focus—that is, a conceptualization of social capital as a community-level, rather 
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than an actor-level, property (Portes, 1998). This builds on earlier sociological conceptualization 
of social capital as grounded in group relations, such as Bourdieu's (1985: 248), who defined social 
capital as “the aggregate of actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable 
network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition”. In 
a similar fashion, Coleman (1988: 98) noted that “unlike other forms of capital, social capital 
inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors. It is not lodged either in the 
actors themselves or in physical implements of production”. While different in many respects, the 
theorizations of social capital offered by Bourdieu and Coleman are brought together by a common 
focus on networks of social relationships comprising individuals and families, as well as structural 
features—such as density—of such networks. 
In contrast to the network-oriented approaches described above, in the 1980s and 1990s 
political scientist Robert Putnam championed an alternative conceptualization whereby social 
capital is defined as a public good; a community-level feature potentially applicable to entire 
societies. Social capital is then recast as the collection of “features of social organizations, such as 
networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate action and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 
1993: 35). This expanded definition—which, over time, proved to be perhaps the most popular—
goes beyond social relationships to encompass dimensions of community participation such as 
“newspaper reading, membership in voluntary associations, and expressions of trust in political 
authorities” (Portes, 1998: 18). Among the most best studied components of social capital within 
this literature are ethnic integration (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000, 2014), trust (Guiso, Sapienza, & 
Zingales, 2008; Knack & Keefer, 1997), and membership in voluntary associations (e.g. Ruef & 
Kwon, 2016). These dimensions underscore the idea that social cohesion rests primarily on the 
extent to which: a) the community is homogenous, rather than balkanized; b) individuals within 
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the community are able to trust each other; and c) individuals are actively engaged in community 
activities that require social interaction and collaboration.  
Entrepreneurship and the community. In parallel with these advancements in the 
literature on social capital, scholars across disciplines have broadly acknowledged that the 
underlying social structure of a community can have lasting effect on entrepreneurial patterns, as 
well as on the growth and evolution of entrepreneurial ecosystems (Westlund & Bolton, 2003). 
Indeed, the very notion of an entrepreneurial ecosystem is ultimately that of a complex social, 
cultural, and material structure, comprising not just entrepreneurs and their ventures, but also 
educational institutions, investors, funds, as well as specialized organizations such as incubators 
and accelerators (Spigel, 2015). Arguably, ecosystems rest as much on intangible aspects, such as 
the relationships between social actors and cultural elements (Aoyama, 2009), as much as they do 
on economic and technical factors like market openness or physical infrastructure. It is therefore 
little wonder that the social and cultural milieu of a community often plays an outsize role in 
determining the entrepreneurial features of local ecosystems. 
In this regard, a recent study by Kwon, Heflin, & Ruef (2013) sheds light on the linkages 
between community social capital and entrepreneurship, measured as the prevalence of self-
employment. By leveraging multiple archival datasets, such as the General Social Survey (GSS) 
and the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey (SCCBS), the authors find that communities 
characterized by greater social trust have a higher prevalence of entrepreneurship. Furthermore, 
membership in certain voluntary organizations was also associated with higher entrepreneurship 
rates at the community level. These findings point to social capital playing a significant role in 
entrepreneurial choices and, by extension, in shaping the entrepreneurial proclivity of the 
community. For what pertains to entrepreneurial ecosystems, therefore, my first (baseline) 
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hypothesis is that metropolitan areas characterized by greater social capital should also have a 
higher number of entrepreneurs in their ecosystem, other things being equal. Formally:  
 
Hypothesis 1. MSAs with greater social capital will be characterized by a higher number of (VC-
backed) entrepreneurs. 
 
Community and the supply of capital. Considerations similar to the ones made about 
consumers of capital can be extended to suppliers of capital within the ecosystem—that is, 
individuals and organizations that choose to invest in new ventures. In this regard, existing studies 
of venture financing have predominantly focused on venture capital (VC) and the social structure 
thereof (Hochberg et al., 2015, 2007; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2010)—indeed, by now a 
sizeable literature has emerged to link the network patterns of suppliers of capital with a variety of 
outcomes including new venture founding, employment, and aggregate income (Samila & 
Sorenson, 2011); alliance formation (Lindsey, 2008); patent and product  innovation (Pahnke, 
Katila, & Eisenhardt, 2015); and the professionalization of start-up companies (Hellmann & Puri, 
2002). What has received notably less attention in this area of inquiry, however, are the antecedents 
of the supply of capital to young ventures: that is, why do individuals and organizations decide to 
engage in venture financing, relative to other capital allocation options? And once they do take 
this step, what kind of ventures do they choose to finance? These questions are important, insofar 
as they help determine what ventures will get funded and, in turn, the direction in which a given 
ecosystem will evolve.  
In this regard, scholars have only recently begun to investigate the latter question, 
examining how homophily dynamics (Greenberg & Mollick, 2017; Kanze et al., 2018) and other 
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cognitive biases (Brooks et al., 2014; Huang & Pearce, 2015) influence decision-making by 
investors in entrepreneurial finance. The former question, however, concerning how individuals 
and organizations decide to pursue venture financing opportunities remains largely unexplored, 
and is therefore ripe for theoretical investigation. In the first chapter of this dissertation, I partially 
addressed it by looking at the role of generalized reciprocity and homophily in the decision by 
entrepreneurs to become angel investors. Here, I complement and extend the above line of 
argument by proposing that, in a similar fashion, social capital will also play a substantial role in 
the provision of capital, in that it is likely to shape whether individuals choose to pursue angel 
investing, and if they do, what kind of individuals and ventures they might choose to finance. 
A useful starting point for my argument here is provided by Samila & Sorenson's (2017) 
study of the complementary role played by community-level social capital and venture capital in 
shaping outcomes at the ecosystem level. The authors found that communities with a higher degree 
of interconnectedness—measured here as racial micro-geographical integration—benefitted more 
from venture capital, as far as innovation, entrepreneurship and economic growth are concerned. 
This is because social capital, in the form of community integration, creates increased 
opportunities for social interaction. In turn, enhanced social interaction then results in better 
mentoring for entrepreneurs, greater circulation of ideas, and improved resource mobilization. 
Another relevant study is Kwon et al. (2013), which found a positive relationship between 
community social capital and entrepreneurship, on the grounds that “individuals receive distinct 
advantages from being embedded in effective brokers—organizations that, both intentionally and 
unintentionally, connect people to other people, organizations, and their resources” (Small, 2009: 
18). The socialization spaces made available by social capital therefore promote entrepreneurship 
primarily by: 1) putting individuals in contact with a broader and more diverse group of people, 
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increasing network diversity and decreasing closure; and 2) enabling knowledge circulation and 
information transfer, factors which are likely to result in an easier identification of entrepreneurial 
opportunities.  
A common thread between these two studies is that community-level social capital—
however defined—is associated with enhanced and improved forms of interaction across social 
barriers such as race, gender, profession, or class, as well as with a greater degree of information 
circulation. How do these factors relate to the supply of capital, and more specifically to an 
entrepreneur’s decision to pursue it by entering angel investing? My argument is that in 
communities characterized by greater social capital, entrepreneurs will be exposed to a greater 
wealth of information about potential new ventures, as well as greater opportunities to socialize 
with people who either are, or are interested in becoming, entrepreneurs. Because of the brokerage-
enhancing effect of social capital, therefore, entrepreneurs in such communities should be 
especially prone to come into contact with new ventures and choose to invest in them. Conversely, 
in communities that are relatively more fragmented and isolated, entrepreneurs will receive less 
exposure to other entrepreneurs—both current and potential—and will therefore less inclined to 
pursue angel investing as a capital allocation strategy, focusing instead on alternative options such 
as real estate or the stock market. Formally, then:  
 
Hypothesis 2. MSAs with greater social capital will see a higher number of (VC-backed) 
entrepreneurs become angel investors. 
 
Once entrepreneurs within a community do become angel investors, however, the question 
of what types of individuals and ventures they will choose to invest in naturally arises. In this 
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regard, my third and final argument is that the stronger sense of community identification that 
social capital fosters should make investing in other entrepreneurs within the community 
preferable. This is because, ever since Coleman (1988), social capital has been associated with the 
idea that community members support each other. In a similar fashion, Portes & Vickstrom (2011: 
473) note that one of the characteristics of community social capital is the emergence of organic 
solidarity, as well as the existence of an “emotional identification that the individual feels with her 
metropolis”, built on “shared values and the recognition of a common normative order required 
for the fulfillment of individual goals”. Under these conditions, individuals are especially likely to 
identify strongly as members of a given community, to feel a sense of obligation towards it, and 
to support it in times of need.  
 But how do these general arguments surrounding community social capital apply to venture 
financing—if at all—and more specifically to angel investing? Among the manifold reasons why 
people might choose to become angel investors (see Shane, 2008 for a comprehensive discussion) 
the desire to give back is often features prominently, as does the decision to “give back” in some 
way. Many angel investors go as far as framing their activities as acts of responsibility toward the 
community, or as a way to help individuals realize their true potential. This theme emerged time 
and time again during the interviews I conducted with angel investors. For example, a leading 
angel investor in New York City openly expressed a preference for investing in local ventures and 
stated that doing so was not merely a matter of convenience: 
 
“Not only is investing locally more convenient, but it is also a way for me to give back and contribute to the New 




Another investor, who had started an angel group for alumni of the university he attended as an 
undergraduate, described how being part of a shared social group can make all the difference when 
it comes to providing or receiving venture financing:  
 
“…when people are connected by an affinity—alumni groups, for example—they are flat-out more willing to help 
one another. […] Somebody who sold a company for a billion dollars is infinitely more likely to serve on a board of 
a seed company when they share a common bond.” 
 
These quotes suggest that embeddedness—or the superimposition of social and economic ties 
within communities—is a primary driver of investment decisions. If the community in which an 
investor is embedded is rich in social capital, therefore, I would expect him or her to be especially 
prone to finance other entrepreneurs in the community—relative to entrepreneurs located 
elsewhere—because doing so represents a tangible way to give back to the community while at 
the same time building relationships and contributing to the local ecosystem’s growth. Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 3. MSAs with greater social capital will see a higher number of angel investments 
targeting companies within the same MSA.  
 
DATA AND METHODS  
Data and methods. The main data source for this study is CrunchBase, a crowdsourced 
but curated online database of the startup ecosystem, comprising information not just about 
startups and their founders, but also about investors, funds, incubators, accelerators, and other 
entities that are also part of the ecosystem. CrunchBase also maintains a record of investments in 
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new ventures by individuals and organizations; while venture capital investments are extensively 
tracked by commercial databases, this is remarkable, insofar as it is—to my knowledge—the first 
available, large-scale public records of angel investments in the United States. Originally a spin-
off of online magazine TechCrunch, over time CrunchBase has grown to be the most 
comprehensive source for entrepreneurship data currently available (e.g. see Ter Wal, Alexy, 
Block, & Sandner, 2016; Wang, Pahnke, & McDonald, 2015). I used CrunchBase to create a list 
of founders of startups in the United States within our observation window; that is, between 2005 
and 2015. I end my analysis in 2015 because it was the last full year of available data at the time 
when the data collection took place; on the other hand, the analysis begins in 2005 to ensure data 
quality since CrunchBase coverage gets spotty before then. Furthermore, because not all 
individuals on CrunchBase can be traced back to a specific metropolitan area, I used LinkedIn to 
search for those individuals with missing location information, thereby reducing the incidence and 
impact of missing data. 
Dependent variables. For Hypothesis 1, the dependent variable is the number of VC-
backed entrepreneurs within the MSA in year t, as reported on CrunchBase. As far as the 
operationalization of this variable is concerned, in this study I focus on VC-backed entrepreneurs 
to ensure data quality and representativeness. This is because CrunchBase, which mainly relies on 
crowdsourcing for information, is notoriously characterized by uneven information quality, 
especially for what concerns individuals. In other words, CrunchBase is likely characterized by 
non-random missing data; however, limiting the scope of this study to VC-backed entrepreneurs 
allows for greater accuracy, insofar as these entrepreneurs tend to appear on CrunchBase at a much 
higher rate, and their information is typically verified and triangulated by staff using additional 
data sources such as the website AngelList, as well as commercial databases covering venture 
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capital, such as VentureSource and VentureXpert. Individuals are assumed to become VC-backed 
entrepreneurs—thereby being counted for the purposes of variable construction—when the first 
venture they founded receives VC funding, and to remain so throughout the observation period.  
For Hypothesis 2, the dependent variable is the number of VC-backed entrepreneurs that 
transitioned to angel investing within the MSA up to year t. To compute this variable, I first 
considered the VC-backed entrepreneurs listed on CrunchBase, identified using the procedure 
described above. Then, I coded entrepreneurs as having made the transition to angel investing 
when they are recorded in CrunchBase as having made their first personal investment in a venture 
other than their own; these individuals are then assumed to be active angel investors thereafter. 
Once again, I chose this operationalization to ensure data quality and accuracy, at the cost of a 
reduced sample size. While a majority of angels nationwide are current or former entrepreneurs, 
there are undoubtedly many who have had careers in other fields—such as banking and finance—
and who therefore might not appear in the dataset. On the other hand, maintaining a narrow focus 
on entrepreneurs—even at the cost of reduced generalizability—allows me to examine a rather 
homogenous set of individuals, thereby setting up a somewhat cleaner empirical test. 
Finally, as far as Hypothesis 3 is concerned, the relevant dependent variable is the number 
of investment made by angels in the MSA towards ventures in the same MSA at year t. To construct 
this variable, I simply considered the population of entrepreneurs-turned-angels, as identified in 
the previous paragraph, and counted the number of investments made towards other companies. I 
then identified the location of these companies, based on information publicly available on 
CrunchBase and LinkedIn about them—and only considering those whose headquarters are within 
the MSA boundaries. In a separate robustness check described in the results section, I also use a 
modified version of this variable operationalized as the ratio between the number of investments 
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made by angels active within the MSA and directed towards ventures located in the same MSA 
and the overall number of investments made by angels within the MSA (regardless of their 
destination). Because the denominator of this ratio is zero for most observations in the data—
which reduces the sample size substantially—I only use this variable in robustness checks, rather 
than in the main results section.  
Independent variable. The main independent variable for all hypotheses is the social 
capital of the focal Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). As far as the operationalization of this 
variable is concerned, Kwon, Heflin, & Ruef (2013) note that historically two different kinds of 
measures were used to gauge social capital within communities: trust and social bonds. Insofar as 
social capital within a well-defined geographic area is defined as the “features of social life—
networks, norms, and trust—that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue 
shared interests” (Putnam, 1995: 664-665), it can be conceptualized “as a community property 
more than an individual one, and is expressed as the level of social trust and breadth of 
organizational memberships among residents” (Kwon et al., 2013). Within sociology, however, 
social trust is typically measured through surveys such as the General Social Survey (GSS) or the 
Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey (SCCBS), which cover a variety of geographical 
areas across the United States. These datasets, however, have several drawbacks that make them 
unsuitable for the purposes of this study. While SCCBS contains information about a fairly large 
number of respondents in each geographical area, it is not conducted annually and it focuses on a 
limited number of communities without covering all U.S. states; further, it not does contain 
multiple-year observations in the same geographic areas, making a panel-type study all but 
impossible. Conversely, the General Social Survey (GSS) is conducted annually and also includes 
measures of trust; however, even with the confidential micro-level data provided through the 
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Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS), the dataset: a) does not adequately cover all MSAs every 
year in our observation window; and b) only contains information about a fairly limited number 
of respondents in each MSA, which poses validity concerns. In all, the data currently available 
does not allow to set up a yearly, trust-based measure of social capital that matches our observation 
window. 
This leaves social bonds, which are traditionally operationalized—following Putnam 
(1993)—as a function of patterns of civic engagement within the community, on the grounds that 
engagement in the activities of civic organizations can “instill in their members habits of economic 
cooperation, solidarity, and public spiritedness” (Putnam, 1993: 89-90). Empirically, therefore, 
this has resulted in social capital being measured as the density of voluntary and nonprofit 
associations—i.e. the associational density—within the community. This is because cooperation 
and information sharing are presumed to be facilitated and catalyzed when opportunities for 
socialization—and dedicated spaces where socialization can take place—are numerous. For the 
purposes of this study, I thus operationalize social capital as the number of nonprofit and voluntary 
organizations within the MSA, as described and identified by Rupasingha, Goetz, & Freshwater 
(2006), which describes a methodology for the calculation of social capital at the county level. In 
brief, for each county in year t I counted the number of establishments in the following categories: 
a) civic organizations; b) bowling centers; c) golf clubs; d) fitness centers; e) sports organizations; 
f) religious organizations; g) political organizations; (h) labor organizations; i) business 
organizations; and j) professional organizations. To obtain a MSA-level measure, I then added up 
the number of establishments in all counties the MSA comprises, and then divided by the MSA 
population to obtain a standardized, comparable figure. To implement the procedure described 
above, I leverage the County Business Patterns (CBP) database, a U.S. Census annual series that 
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provides subnational economic data by industry. This series includes the number of 
establishments, employment during the week of March 12, first quarter payroll, and annual payroll, 
all reported at the county level and grouped by NAICS code. This allows to identify the type of 
establishment with precision, insofar as each of the groupings described in the previous paragraph 
corresponds to a unique NAICS code.24  
Control variables. To rule out competing explanations and validate my arguments 
concerning the linkages between social capital, entrepreneurship and angel investing, all of my 
models include a battery of control variables. First of all, it is imperative to control for other 
community-level features that might affect entrepreneurship and angel investing other than social 
capital. To this end, I include variables for the population of the MSA, in that more highly-
populated areas might be especially prone to produce more vibrant entrepreneurial ecosystems. 
Because the availability of disposable income is likely to be associated with the likelihood to 
engage in angel investing, I also include a variable for the median household income within the 
MSA, as well as one for the percent of individuals below the poverty line. In a similar fashion, 
because more highly-educated areas tend to characterized by higher rates of entrepreneurship, I 
also include variables for the number of higher education establishments. Finally, to control for 
the general conditions of the local economy, I include a variable for the total number of business 
establishments within the MSA. Some models also include year dummies and MSA dummies, to 
                                                          24 Most extant studies of social capital in sociology have relied on General Social Survey (GSS) data for operationalization purposes. While this data undoubtedly represents the gold standard for this type of analysis, as far as its items concerning social trust are concerned, in my case it is unfortunately impossible to obtain a reliable, time-dependent estimate of social capital at the county level for each year in my observation window. This is because even the private-use GSS data—which comes with geographic identifiers—represents a cross-sectional probability sample of adults in 100 geographic areas in the contiguous United States (for further details, see Smith, Marsden, Hout, & Kim, 2010). As a result, yearly GSS data does not cover all MSAs in my sample, making this particular data source poorly suited for the purposes of my analysis. 
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control for unobserved heterogeneity that is not captured by the remaining control variables. Table 
1 reports summary statistics for all variables used, as well as Pearson correlation coefficients. 
 
------------------------- Insert Table 3.1 about here ------------------------- 
RESULTS  
------------------------- Insert Table 3.2 about here ------------------------- 
 
Table 2 reports the results of fixed-effects panel OLS models where the dependent variable is the 
logged number of VC-backed entrepreneurs within the MSA; these are used to test Hypothesis 1. 
Among the models reported, Model 1 includes just control variables, while Model 2 includes year 
dummies to control for time effects, and Model 3 adds the main independent variable, social capital 
(measured as associational density). The coefficient for this latter variable is positive and 
significant, providing support for Hypothesis 1 and indicating that—controlling for other factors—
MSAs characterized by higher social capital also tend to produce more (VC-backed) entrepreneurs. 
The coefficients for some of the control variables are also noteworthy: educational variables—i.e. 
the number of higher education establishments and the percentage of individuals with a college 
degree—are positively associated with the number of VC-backed entrepreneurs, as is (predictably) 
the MSA population, which further corroborates the idea that education plays a key role in the 
growth and development of entrepreneurial ecosystems. 
 




To test Hypothesis 2, Table 3 reports fixed-effects panel OLS models for the logged number of 
VC-backed entrepreneurs-turned-angels within the MSA. Once again, Model 4 includes just 
control variables, while Model 5 adds time dummies and Model 6 is the full model, inclusive of 
the social capital variable, whose coefficient is positive and significant, providing support for 
Hypothesis 2. More generally, the pattern of findings in Model 6 confirms the positive role of 
education in the growth of ecosystems, especially as the provision of venture financing is 
concerned. Furthermore, as predicted, economic variables have an impact as well: not only is the 
coefficient for median household income positive and significant, which was fairly 
straightforward, but the same is true of the poverty variable. This rather counterintuitive set of 
findings can perhaps be explained by the fact that the prosperous areas of the U.S. where 
entrepreneurial ecosystems are more likely to be found and thrive also happen be characterized by 
high levels of economic inequality.   
 
------------------------- Insert Table 3.4 about here ------------------------- 
 
Moving on to Hypothesis 3, Table 4 reports fixed-effects panel OLS models for the logged number 
of angel investments made by angels located in the MSA towards companies in the same MSA. 
As seen previously, Model 7 includes just control variables, Model 8 incorporates time dummies, 
and Model 9 is the full model. Once again, the pattern of results confirm a positive association 
between social capital and within-MSA angel investment, corroborating Hypothesis 3; moreover, 
the coefficients for control variables are in line with those seen in the previous tables.  
 




The results in Table 4, however, could be driven by the overall number of investments made by 
angels within the MSA, rather than by the number of them that remain within the MSA. To rule 
out the possibility that this effect might be spurious, therefore, I ran additional fixed-effects, panel 
OLS models where the dependent variable is the ratio between the investments made by the MSA 
angels towards ventures located within the same MSA and the total number of angel investments 
made by the same individuals; the results are reported in Table 5. Because the ratio denominator 
is zero in most observations, however, these models have a much reduced sample size—less than 
a tenth of the original number of observations. This notwithstanding, Model 12 in Table 5 shows 
an effect for social capital that is still positive and significant, albeit at the .10 level—likely a 
function of the reduction in statistical power.  
 
DISCUSSION  
A long line of inquiry in organizational studies (e.g. Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Walker et al., 
1997), sociology (Granovetter, 1985, 2005), and entrepreneurship has maintained that patterns of 
economic exchange rest on the characteristics of the social milieu in which they are embedded. 
More recently,  scholars have also begun looking into whether local, community-level patterns of 
socialization might have a bearing on entrepreneurship rates (Kwon et al., 2013) as well as on the 
financing of new ventures and its effectiveness (Samila & Sorenson, 2017).  In this study, my goal 
was to further research into this area of inquiry by investigating the relationship between the 
community-level construct of social capital and the trajectory of local entrepreneurial ecosystems, 
with specific reference to: a) the local prevalence of entrepreneurs; b) the latter’s odds of becoming 
suppliers of capital—that is, angel investors; and c) the degree to which angel investments tend to 
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benefit the local community by targeting local ventures, as opposed to ventures based in other 
metropolitan areas. I did so by leveraging a panel study of Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) 
in the United States between 2005 and 2015, with information on entrepreneurs, angel investors, 
ventures and funding rounds pulled from CrunchBase. In so doing, I found that: 1) controlling for 
economic and demographic variables, communities characterized by higher social capital tend to 
produce significantly more entrepreneurs; 2) the entrepreneurs produced by each MSA tend to 
transition to angel investing at a higher rate when community social capital is greater; and 3) in 
the same areas, angel investors will also be comparatively more likely to finance ventures within 
the community. Overall, the pattern of empirical results I obtained suggests a catalyzing role for 
community-level social capital as far as the entrepreneurial ecosystem is concerned: communities 
characterized by greater interconnectedness, and by the availability of socialization spaces where 
human interaction across entrenched social barriers can take place, are at an advantage when it 
comes to developing and growing a local entrepreneurial ecosystem. This is because the wealth of 
social ties and opportunities for interaction that characterize communities that are rich in social 
capital favor information exchange, opportunity discovery and identification, as well as a greater 
sense of involvement and belonging in one’s social setting.  
It is my contention that these results contribute to the literatures previously mentioned in 
several ways. For what pertains to entrepreneurship, this study highlights how social capital can 
catalyze entrepreneurs’ transition to angel investing and their capital allocation choices, which is 
relevant insofar as such choices help shape both founding and funding processes (Hellmann & 
Thiele, 2018). Organizational scholars and economic sociologists might derive insights from my 
study for what pertains to the extent to which social dynamics drive market entry in venture 
financing, and how capital allocation decisions—long the domain of finance scholars—can 
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actually being explained through sociological theorizing. And finance scholars might equally find 
the results to be of interest, since they show how individuals choose to become suppliers of capital 
(Brown et al., 2008; Hong et al., 2004) and what social processes might help shape capital 
allocation. 
Although my theoretical arguments and empirical results offer some insights that are useful 
for the scholarly understanding of ecosystem dynamics, the following limitations of my study must 
also be noted. First of all, for what pertains to the entrepreneurship literature, I must point out that 
while CrunchBase’s coverage of the entrepreneurial ecosystem is fairly comprehensive, and 
especially so for those ventures that have received VC funding at any point, my data is not 
especially suitable for studying entrepreneurship in the United States at large. This is not just 
because the ventures listed in CrunchBase represent an infinitely small fraction of all U.S. 
ventures, but predominantly due to the fact that entrepreneurship is an extremely varied and diverse 
phenomenon, potentially comprising everything from Facebook to a one-man design studio, or a 
bodega. My conclusions, therefore, likely do not generalize to new businesses at large, but only 
for those of interest to angel investors and venture capital—that is, ventures with the potential for 
high-growth. Second, the process through which I constructed my analytical sample only considers 
VC-backed ventures and their founders. This is in line with other research efforts being undertaken 
in our field (Ter Wal et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2018), while simultaneously ensuring that ventures 
and founders meet a minimum quality threshold; yet, many startups fail to receive venture capital 
and as such their founders, as well as the investments they receive from angels, fail to appear in 
my study. The future availability of improved data sources or a more comprehensive coverage of 
non-VC-funded ventures by CrunchBase will hopefully allow to circumvent this problem. Third, 
my results only reflect the behavior of angel investors who have been entrepreneurs. As previously 
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discussed, current and former entrepreneurs represent a majority of U.S. angel investors, which 
makes sense insofar as they are perhaps uniquely positioned to do well given their prior knowledge 
of the ecosystem and their experience raising venture financing. However, angel investors can hail 
from many other walks of life. While CrunchBase makes it difficult to track these people, different 
methodological choices—such as studying the outcomes of an angel group that comprises both 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs—could perhaps help scholars address this issue at a later 
date. And finally, in this study I only focus on angel investing, while neglecting other forms of 
capital supply such as venture capital: this is both because venture capital has been extensively 
investigated in our field and because it is relatively harder to conceptualize venture capital funding 
decisions as being taken by individuals 
Future research could usefully address these shortcomings and advance research in a 
variety of potential ways. First and foremost, further work investigating the supply of capital as a 
social phenomenon is sorely needed. While in this dissertation I have sketched an initial theory of 
how the supply of capital—as it pertains to entry decisions by individuals, as well as their capital 
allocation choices—is governed by social mechanisms, as well as by the community characteristics 
in which ecosystems are embedded, collectively we need to refine the scholarly understanding of 
the social structure of capital supply. Second, further research could explore the complementarities 
between angel investing and venture capital (Hellmann, Schure, & Vo, 2015; Hellmann & Thiele, 
2018), and how each contributes to entrepreneurial growth and, in turn, to ecosystem evolution. 
Indeed, while both of these forms of venture financing have been explored to a degree, they 
typically operate in tandem and are not orthogonal to each other—for instance, getting prominent 
angels on board is seen as a positive signal by venture capitalists, which might make them more 
likely to get on board. Third, while in this study I have focused on the associational density 
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dimension of social capital, the trust dimension is arguably as important, so I am hoping that future 
work will address the role played by trust in the development of funding relationships, as well as 
in the growth of ecosystem more broadly.  
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Table 3.2. Fixed-effects panel OLS models for the logged number of VC-backed entrepreneurs within the MSA. 
Fixed-effects panel OLS       
DV: logged number of VC-backed entrepreneurs in MSA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
        
Median household income 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MSA population (logged) 0.7092+ 0.7525+ 0.7858* 
 (0.397) (0.387) (0.383) 
Number of colleges/universities in MSA 0.0098*** 0.0098** 0.0095** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Percent population with a college degree 10.4778*** 10.9360* 10.6179* 
 (3.062) (4.886) (4.807) 
Number of business establishments in MSA -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Percent individuals below poverty line 0.8999 1.0871 1.1643 
 (1.138) (0.789) (0.789) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes 
    
Social capital   544.3337* 
   (228.083) 
Constant -11.1089* -11.8631* -12.6177** 
 (4.728) (4.907) (4.830) 
    
Observations 4,158 4,158 4,158 
R-squared 0.424 0.424 0.427 
Number of MSAs 378 378 378 
Log-likelihood 772.6 774.5 785.2 
Degrees of freedom 5 15 16 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10    
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Table 3.3. Fixed-effects panel OLS models for the logged number of VC-backed entrepreneurs-turned-angels within the MSA. 
Fixed-effects panel OLS       
DV: logged number of entrepreneurs-turned-angels in MSA Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
        
Median household income 0.0000** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MSA population (logged) -0.0544 0.0748 0.0866 
 (0.177) (0.184) (0.183) 
Number of colleges/universities in MSA 0.0090** 0.0091** 0.0090** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Percent population with a college degree 1.6760** 3.0336* 2.9206* 
 (0.587) (1.265) (1.235) 
Number of business establishments in MSA 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Percent individuals below poverty line 0.0148 0.9267** 0.9541*** 
 (0.255) (0.284) (0.285) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes 
    
Social capital   193.3007* 
   (76.910) 
Constant -0.2947 -2.8002 -3.0682 
 (2.161) (2.338) (2.326) 
    
Observations 4,158 4,158 4,158 
R-squared 0.225 0.258 0.260 
Log-likelihood 3456 3546 3552 
Degrees of freedom 5 15 16 
Number of MSAs 378 378 378 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10    
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Table 3.4. Fixed-effects panel OLS models for the logged number of angel investments made by angels in the MSA towards companies in the same MSA. 
Fixed-effects panel OLS       
DV: logged number of angel investments made towards the same MSA Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
        
Median household income 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MSA population (logged) -0.8829* -0.6842+ -0.6608+ 
 (0.394) (0.367) (0.365) 
Number of colleges/universities in MSA 0.0142* 0.0145* 0.0143* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Percent population with a college degree 3.3079+ 4.4488 4.2244 
 (1.768) (3.186) (3.112) 
Number of business establishments in MSA 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Percent individuals below poverty line 0.2822 1.8539** 1.9083** 
 (0.565) (0.671) (0.677) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes 
    
Social capital   383.9202** 
   (142.461) 
Constant 9.0635* 5.1882 4.6560 
 (4.526) (4.240) (4.210) 
    
Observations 4,158 4,158 4,158 
R-squared 0.163 0.199 0.201 
Log-likelihood 979.5 1071 1077 
Degrees of freedom 5 15 16 
Number of MSAs 378 378 378 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10    
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Table 3.5. Fixed-effects panel OLS models for the ratio of angel investments made by angels in the MSA towards companies in the same MSA to the total number of angel investments made by individuals in the MSA. 
Fixed-effects panel OLS       
DV: percent angel investments made towards same MSA Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
        
Median household income 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MSA population (logged) -1.2937 -1.1369 -0.7622 
 (0.792) (0.912) (0.896) 
Number of colleges/universities in MSA 0.0028 0.0022 0.0027 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Percent population with a college degree 1.4088 0.6299 0.3800 
 (0.868) (0.758) (0.698) 
Number of business establishments in MSA -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Percent individuals below poverty line 6.4399* 5.1175 5.5125 
 (3.225) (6.138) (5.927) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes 
    
Social capital   2,613.9833+ 
   (1,448.143) 
Constant 17.0872 15.0326 8.7000 
 (10.781) (13.068) (12.841) 
    
Observations 403 403 403 
R-squared 0.036 0.057 0.067 
Log-likelihood 46.02 50.36 52.51 
Degrees of freedom 5 15 16 
Number of MSAs 94 94 94 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    








Throughout its three chapters, this dissertation represents one of the first instances of scholarly 
inquiry into the informal supply of capital to new ventures to focus primarily on human and social 
factors—in other words, on its behavioral aspects. The topic of angel investing has certainly been 
broached before (Shane, 2008; Van Osnabrugge & Robinson, 2000), and often at length; yet, 
venture financing by individuals remains an interesting empirical puzzle for management and 
entrepreneurship scholars, as well as—I would argue—economic sociologists.  
For instance, in Chapter I, I elaborated on the reasons behind individual entrepreneurs’ 
decisions to enter angel investing, insofar as several alternatives that are relatively more profitable 
and less risky are available to them. As a result, theories in economics and finance that are 
traditionally used to construct accounts of investor behavior, such as portfolio theory (Markowitz, 
1959), largely fail to account for the behavior of angel investors. Qualitative field observation and 
interviews, however, were suggestive of prosocial motivations being at play: many angels noted 
that they enjoyed the human component of angel investments, and several remarked that they felt 
it was their duty to contribute to the entrepreneurial ecosystem they were part of, given that most 
of them had received assistance by various ecosystem entities in the past. Building on these 
intuitions, and drawing on multiple strands of the sociology literature, I then develop a behavioral 
theory of angel investing that draws on the long-standing sociological ideas of generalized 
reciprocity and homophily to theorize about the processes through which entrepreneurs become 
angel investors. My empirical results are broadly in agreement with the theory, providing evidence 
that: 1) founders receiving angel investments are more likely to become angel investors in turn; 
and 2) this is especially true when founders are financed by angels who are similar to them. 
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Furthermore, results also show that homophily is reproduced across “generations” of angel 
investors, and that entrepreneurs who are financed by angels similar to them tend to invest similar 
founders as well upon becoming angel investors. 
In Chapter II, I then reflected on the problem of performance in angel investing, starting 
from the premise that early-stage venture financing, of which angel investing is typically part of, 
is typically carried out in an information vacuum. Because entrepreneurs typically seek money 
from angels in the pre-revenue stage, there is a dearth of information available on the objective 
value of an entrepreneurial idea, as well as about the founding team’s ability to successfully 
execute it. As a result, angel investors implement a variety of uncertainty reduction techniques, 
such as heavily weighing referrals from trusted contacts or relying on homophily as an evaluative 
heuristic. All of the above has resulted in early-stage venture financing being configured as more 
of an art than a science, given the lack of strong correlates of performance in angel investing. We 
have sought to change that by laying out potential antecedents of success in angel investing based 
on existing debates in the organizational literature concerning what makes individuals effective in 
certain roles, either within organizations or in market settings at large. In so doing, we find that 
generalists—i.e. angels who invest across market categories—tend to do comparatively better than 
angels with more specialized investing profiles. Furthermore, results show that this effect is 
moderated by the angel’s past experience as a founder—entrepreneurs who founded companies 
across industries tend to do better when they invest across industries, as well. Results also show 
that an individual’s success as a founder—in terms of founding ventures that were acquired or 
went public—correlates with later success as an investor, presumably because success in 
entrepreneurship, being an exceedingly rare event, offers unique opportunities for learning. The 
effect of entrepreneurial success on angel investing success is also moderated by the degree of 
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overlap between the industries in which the angel invests and those in which (s)he founded 
companies; this suggests that the “lessons learned” from success do not apply universally, but 
rather are contingent on the degree to which it is relevant to the task at hand. 
Finally, in Chapter III I examine the interrelations between venture financing and the 
communities in which entrepreneurial ecosystems are embedded. This is a germane question, 
insofar as qualitative evidence from interviews and field observation has shown that social 
considerations drive both the decision to enter angel investing and, once individuals take this step, 
the choice of investments. The construct of social capital, as used in sociology (Putnam, 1993), is 
therefore uniquely apt to model the degree to which social ties at the community level shape 
ecosystem dynamics, as it is a parsimonious measure of the strength of social ties within the 
communities, its interconnectedness, and the availability of spaces where socialization can take 
place. In this regard, my results show that Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) with greater 
social capital: 1) produce more entrepreneurs; 2) see a greater share of these become angel 
investors; and 3) are characterized a greater share of investment targeted towards ventures in the 
community. This pattern of findings speaks to the importance of community-level social structures 
in determining the direction a given ecosystem will evolve towards; social capital, in particular, 
appears to correlate strongly with a greater community orientation, as well as with a greater 
prevalence of informal funding relationships.  
Beyond the specificities of my empirical setting, I maintain my results offer useful 
contributions to organizational studies, the entrepreneurship literature, and the scholarly 
knowledge of the intersection between ecosystems and communities more generally. One relevant 
theme that cuts across the whole dissertation concerns entry into capital markets by individuals: 
why do individuals decide to become suppliers of capital? My findings across the three chapters 
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show that beyond individual proclivities and genetic factors, the social context plays a substantial 
role in determining the transition from entrepreneurship to angel investing. Entrepreneurs are not 
just more likely to become angels when they have been financed by angels, thereby being exposed 
to their activities and “primed” to follow their lead; rather, community-level structures play a role 
too, insofar as communities that offer greater opportunities for socialization and for the formation 
of social ties tend to fare better, in terms of both the number of angel investors relative to the 
population and the fraction of investments that target ventures in the same community. Similar 
arguments, I believe, could be made in the case of entry decisions in other types of markets, such 
as crowdfunding, venture capital, or microfinance. In a similar fashion, as far as performance in 
angel investing is concerned, I believe our arguments are not specific to our empirical setting but 
could easily be generalized to other settings. In particular, our considerations on the role of 
specialization—which were, in turn, extrapolated from Lazear's (2004) arguments about 
entrepreneurship—could potentially apply to many types of investors, including venture 
capitalists. While the generalizability of the above findings is, in my opinion, quite broad, the 
mechanisms discussed above likely affect different types of investors differently, so it might be of 
substantial theoretical interest to examine the boundary conditions of my arguments as they are 
extended to different types of investments.  
While I do believe my work offers useful contributions to the literature, as well as to the 
scholarly understanding of angel investing, some of its (general) limitations must be noted. 
Throughout the dissertation, I have limited my analyses to a sub-sample of angel investors: those 
with past entrepreneurial experience. I have done so primarily because of data availability issue, 
but I also considered this setup advantageous insofar as it allowed me to test my arguments on a 
relatively homogenous sample of individuals. While most angel investors in the U.S. have been 
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entrepreneurs at some point however, many others—especially in New York City—come from the 
private sector, with banking, consulting and finance being the most common paths leading to angel 
investing. These investors tend to be older, as they often begin pursuing angel investing when they 
are close to retiring, and their motives and investment styles likely differ from those of former 
entrepreneurs. For this reason, any extension of my arguments to this sub-population should be 
taken with a grain of salt. I am hopeful, however, to be able to collect data on non-entrepreneur 
angels in the future, and to weigh the extent to which their behavior differs from those of former 
entrepreneurs. Another limitation worth noting concerns the process through which the main 
dataset was constructed: because Crunchbase—being crowdsourced—does not cover all ventures 
with an equal level of detail, and because venture-backed startups tend to have much better 
information available, I limited by analysis to such ventures, and to their founders. This likely 
introduces bias, in that ventures that receive VC funding are likely of above average quality relative 
to the total population. The same problem also extends to the angel investor sample: because I only 
consider former entrepreneurs, and because all former entrepreneurs in the sample have received 
venture capital funding at some point, the sample likely excludes slightly less successful 
entrepreneurs who might have become angels nonetheless. In the future, assuming better data 
sources are available, I would like to relax this constraint and explore any and all angel investors 
I might have left out of this initial sample. Finally, due to budgetary constraints I was only able to 
carry out interviews and participant observation at a limited number of locations in the Tri-State 
area centered around New York City, with the lone exception of my attendance of the annual Angel 
Capital Association meeting. Because some of the arguments made in my dissertation, especially 
as it pertains to Chapter III, hinge on geographic variation in factors like social capital, I hope that 
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in the future I will be able to carry out fieldwork in other areas of the country, as well, and possibly 
abroad.  
Taken in their entirety, I believe my findings also open up interesting opportunities for 
further empirical research, as many interesting questions remain unexplored. For instance, the 
behavioral side of investing, which my work highlights, could be explored in other forms of 
investing, both within the ecosystem (e.g. crowdfunding, venture capital) and beyond. Further 
work could also highlight the complementarities between the above forms of venture financing—
for instance, raising a successful round of angel investments is often a prelude to receiving venture 
capital funding. Chapter III also offers interesting opportunities for further inquiry between the 
folds of existing findings. For instance, the poverty variable shows a strong association with the 
fraction of entrepreneurs who become angel investors. This is interesting, insofar as extant research 
has shown that economic inequality is generally associated with negative outcomes; for instance, 
innovativeness tends to be lower in contexts with high inequality (although see Aghion, Akcigit, 
Bergeaud, Blundell, & Hémous, 2015). Therefore, hope that further studies will tackle the effects 
of economic inequality on entrepreneurial ecosystems head on. The same is true for several other 
variables of interest to sociologists, such as racial integration (e.g. see Levine et al., 2014), which 
might also be predictive of ecosystem-level outcomes. In all, it is my hope that these loose ends 
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